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REMEDYING TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT:
THE ROLE OF BAD FAITH IN AWARDING AN
ACCOUNTING OF DEFENDANT'S PROFITS
Danielle Conway-Jones*
We are little more than what we create and what we give
back to the world. We speak of leaving our mark, but
what if that mark is stolen, wrongly impugned, or dese-
crated-that mark, representing our very contribution to
the world, fades like dust.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Trademark Act of 1946 ("Lanham Act") has a recent
history as a federal law enacted to protect the power of a
trademark from infringement.! As any unauthorized en-
croachment on a right requires a corresponding remedy, so
too does the unauthorized encroachment of a trademark.!
Thus, the explicit remedies of the Lanham Act include dis-
gorging the defendant's profits, actual damages sustained by
the owner of a mark, the cost of bringing an infringement ac-
tion and, in exceptional cases, the award of attorney's fees.3
All of the remedies, except the first, have passed through the
judiciary without much controversy.4
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Hawai'i, William S. Richard-
son School of Law. LL.M., George Washington University Law School; J.D.,
Howard University School of Law; B.S., New York University Stern School of
Business.
1. See Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999); S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1274 (explaining the reasons for trademark legislation); see also Daphne Robert,
Commentary on The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 373 (1996)
(explaining that the Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, was signed
into law and became effective on July 5, 1947).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117.
3. See id.
4. See James M. Koelemay, Jr., A Practical Guide to Monetary Relief in
Trademark Infringement Cases, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 263, 267-69 (1995).
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Unfortunately, the circuit and district courts have mud-
died the waters in determining when a trademark owner will
be entitled to an accounting of defendant's profits as a remedy
for trademark infringement.5 The judicially created limita-
tion on the accounting of profits remedy appears in the form
of a bad faith requirement.' The bad faith requirement has
found a home in some circuit jurisdictions, while being down-
played or cast aside in other circuit jurisdictions.7 Although
the Supreme Court appeared to render the definitive answer
regarding the potential for a trademark owner to receive an
accounting of profits for a defendant's infringement without
mention of proof of bad faith,8 nearly five decades of circuit
court and district court decisions have resulted in a schizo-
phrenic view of the remedy of an accounting of profits and the
nefarious bad faith requirement.9
With the recent addition of the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act ("FTDA") ° and the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act ("ACPA")," it is becoming increasingly clear
5. See infra App. tbl 1 (illustrating the number of cases decided in each cir-
cuit employing the three basic tests for recovery of an accounting of an in-
fringer's profits).
6. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 30.62 (4th ed. 1996); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 20-25 (1995).
7. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 30.62; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION H8 20-25 (1995).
8. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S.
203, 205-07 (1942); see also infra notes 23, 63-76 and accompanying text.
9. See infra App. tbl. 2 (tracking which circuits require a showing of bad
faith in an accounting of defendant's profits).
10. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109
Stat. 985 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. I 1999)); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 1 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1029 (reporting that the purpose of the dilution legislation is to protect famous
marks, whether registered or not, from subsequent uses that blur, tarnish, or
disparage it, even in the absence of likelihood of confusion).
11. See Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
tit. III, 113 Stat. 1501A-545 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. V
1999)); see also S. REP. NO. 106-140 (1999); H.R. REP. No. 106-412 (1999). The
Senate report explains the purpose of the Act is:
[T]o protect consumers and American businesses, to promote the
growth of online commerce, and to provide clarity in the law for trade-
mark owners by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration of
distinctive marks as Internet domain names with the intent to profit
from the goodwill associated with such marks - a practice commonly
referred to as 'cybersquatting.'
S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4.
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that Congress intends a straightforward interpretation that
bad faith is not required before the Lanham Act remedies be-
come available to a trademark owner for infringement of ei-
ther a registered or unregistered trademark. Specifically, the
language regarding the remedies for dilution, which are dis-
tinguishable from the remedies for infringement, expressly
states that only a showing of willfulness under a claim for di-
lution will entitle the owner of a famous trademark to all of
the Lanham Act remedies, including defendant's profits.12
The express requirement that a mark owner show a willful
violation before perfecting his entitlement to Lanham Act
remedies for dilution supports the premise that the theories
of recovery underlying the remedies for trademark infringe-
ment, as opposed to trademark dilution, are not dependent
upon the existence of a bad faith requirement. 3 Instead, the
bad faith requirement takes its place as but one factor in es-
tablishing that the equities in an infringement action demand
an accounting of profits. 4
This article proposes that Congress did not intend a bad
faith requirement be met before an owner of an infringed
mark is able to recover a defendant's profits collected on the
back of the infringed mark. This thesis, although seemingly
simplistic, must travel a circuitous route through judicial
precedent, statutory construction, and general empirical data
to be proved. To legitimize this thesis, this article will first
introduce in Part II the fundamental tenets and construction
of trademark protection and trademark infringement law. In
Part III, this article will explain the Pre-Lanham Act Su-
12. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a), 1125(c)(2) (Supp. V 1999).
The protection of marks from dilution differs from the protection ac-
corded marks from trademark infringement. Dilution does not rely
upon the standard test of infringement, that is, likelihood of confusion,
deception or mistake. Rather, it applies when the unauthorized use of
a famous mark reduces the public's perception that the mark signifies
something unique, singular, or particular.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030.
13. See infra Part VI.
14. Congress, by its very expression, contemplated a case-by-case analysis
approach to determining the appropriateness of an award of an accounting of
defendant's profits. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). There is no express congressional
requirement that a trademark owner demonstrate the existence of bad faith be-
fore this remedy becomes available to the trademark owner. See id. Instead,
courts must engage in a contemplative balancing of factors or a totality of the
circumstances analysis before deciding to award or refrain from awarding an
accounting of profits in a trademark infringement action. See id.
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preme Court precedent bearing specifically on the remedy of
an accounting of profits. In Part IV, this article will chart the
statutory construction of the Post-Lanham Act remedy of an
accounting for profits. Part V will begin the analysis of the
three interpretations that circuit and district courts have de-
veloped to determine when to allow an accounting of profits,
namely (a) that bad faith is not required before a trial judge
can permit an accounting; (b) that proof of bad faith is only
required to the extent that an owner's mark for non-
competing goods is infringed before a trial judge can permit
an accounting; and (c) that proof of bad faith is required in
every instance of infringement before a trial judge can permit
an accounting. Part VI uses the analysis in Part V as well as
the language, purpose, and spirit of the newly enacted FTDA
and the ACPA to deduce that Congress did not intend to re-
quire proof of bad faith before allowing an owner of a mark to
receive an accounting of defendant's profits as one remedy for
trademark infringement, a Lanham Act violation distinct and
separate from trademark dilution and domain name piracy.
II. THE LAW OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND
INFRINGEMENT
A. Trademark Protection
Graeme Dinwoodie describes the law of trademarks as a
mercantile law. 5 This is an apt description, because trade-
mark use can be traced as far back as the earliest Chinese
dynasties where craftsmen relied upon their stamps to iden-
tify goods. 6 Even in the old English tradition, craftsmen from
various guilds would identify their goods with the trademark
15. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND
POLICY, THE RATIONAL LIMITS OF TRADEMARK LAW (Hugh Hansen ed., 2001).
16. See Graziella M. Sarno, Comment, Vietnam or Bust: Why Trademark
Pirates are Leaving China for Better Opportunities in Vietnam, 14 DICK. J.
INT'L. L. 291, 296 (1996) (stating the historical proposition that China has a
long history of trademark protection dating back to the Tang Dynasty (618-906
A.D.) when traders and merchants used different marks to distinguish their
goods from those of others). See also Geoffrey T. Willard, An Examination of
China's Emerging Intellectual Property Regime: Historical Underpinnings, the
Current System and Prospects for the Future, 6 IND. IN'L & COMP. L. REV. 411,
413 (1996) (stating that "[t]he first known trademarks surfaced in China nearly
3000 years ago, during the reign of the Zhou Dynasty").
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representing the guild as the source of the goods. 7
Trademark protection has two functions. First, trade-
mark protection provides a means to identify the source of the
goods. 8 Second, trademark protection provides a means to
achieve a market advantage in the marketing and sale of
goods. 9 Trademark protection has both social and economic
consequences. Socially, the public is protected from the sale
of unidentified goods whose quality is suspect. 0 Economi-
cally, trademark protection provides a valuable means of
capitalizing on customer goodwill.2'
Historically, the primary purpose of trademark protec-
tion was to prevent palming off, i.e., passing off goods of one
17. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED
STATE DOCTRINES 200-24 (3d ed. 1990) (describing how trade guilds fastened a
distinctive mark to their goods so that the townspeople would know that the
goods came from a specific workshop). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995) ("The guild system of medieval England pro-
duced the first widespread use of trademarks."). Although I did not find A
Knight's Tale a particularly interesting movie, I was humored by one scene that
depicted a struggling female iron welder who belonged to a guild of male iron
welders. See A KNIGHT'S TALE (Columbia Pictures 2001). She secured the op-
portunity to design armor for the Knight impersonator because the Knight could
not afford the armor made by any of the guild's male iron welders. See id.
When the struggling Knight donned his new coat of armor during the jousting
events, the Knight impersonator was struck by the strength, sleekness, and fine
craftswomanship of the armor. Once the Knight impersonator signaled his ap-
proval of the armor, the female iron welder branded the armor with the Nike
swoosh symbol as a trademark designating the origin of the armor as belonging
to her guild. See id.
18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9, at 77 ("Manu-
facturers began to adopt marks expressly for the purpose of identifying their
goods to prospective customers."); see also S. REP. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted
in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274 (stating that the statute protects "the public so it
may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark
which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to
get.").
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9, at 78 ("As the
geographic scope of markets expanded and systems of distribution became in-
creasingly complex, trademarks came to function as an important instrument of
advertising."); see also S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1274, 1275 ("To protect trade-marks... is ... to secure to the business commu-
nity the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion
from those who have created them to those who have not.").
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9, at 78 ("The
public benefits afforded by competitive markets cannot be fully realized unless
prospective consumers can differentiate the products of competing sellers.").
21. See id. ("If the trademark owner succeeds in creating a favorable image
for its trademark in the marketplace, the mark itself can become a significant
factor in stimulating sales. This ability of a mark to generate good will through
advertising has also gained recognition under the law of trademarks.").
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producer or maker as those of another.22 For example, a jun-
ior producer of goods may be prevented from trading its goods
by using the goodwill cultivated by a senior producer of goods.
In the modern era, trademark protection also furthers the
goals of various parties dependent upon commerce. 2' First,
the producer of goods who owns a mark seeks to protect that
mark as well as promote the product associated with the
mark, thereby developing goodwill in the mark.24 Next, the
buyer of a product or good uses the trademark to exercise in-
dividual preference in product purchasing by assessing prod-
uct quality through direct or indirect brand or mark compari-
sons.25  Therefore, trademark law protects the public's
expectation of certain levels of quality when seeing a particu-
lar trademark on a product.5
22. See Steven Schortgen, Note, "Dressing" Up Software Interface Protection:
The Application of Two Pesos to "Look and Feel", 80 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 162,
164 ("[Slection 43(a) is rooted in the common law tort of palming or passing off,
which derives from the torts of fraud and deceit.... Drawing on this common
law tradition, section 43(a) protects unregistered trademarks and explicitly pro-
scribes both 'false designation of origin' and 'false or misleading description' of
goods."); see also infra note 120.
23. Justice Felix Frankfurter articulated the purpose of trademark law in
his opinion from Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Company v. S.S.
Kresge Company. In that opinion, Justice Frankfurter defined the purpose of
trademark protection:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychologi-
cal function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less
true that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandis-
ing short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or
what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits
this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the at-
mosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol.
Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same-to convey through
the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the
commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-
mark owner has something of value. If another poaches upon the
commercial magnetism of the symbol the owner has created, the owner
can obtain legal redress.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942).
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, §9, at 78.
25. See id.
26. See id. ("[Tihe presence of a trademark can signify that the goods or ser-
vices are sponsored or approved by a particular business [and, thusI the trade-
mark functions as an indication of consistent and predictable quality."). See
also Dennis S. Corgill, Measuring the Gains of Trademark Infringement, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1909, 1938 (1997) (explaining that today trademarks do much
more than just identify the source of goods; amidst a myriad functions, trade-
marks signal the quality of a product).
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The essence of trademark protection requires one to re-
spect the intellectual and correspondingly developmental la-
bors and toils of another, which are represented by distin-
guishing symbols, words, names, or devices. 27 The work that
a trademark owner puts into developing a mark to identify
the source of goods will result in goodwill and enhanced repu-
tation. Generally, trademark law protects an intangible
property interest, which is the value of the association be-
21
tween an identifiable mark or symbol and its source.
Prior to Congress enacting federal legislation, trademark
protection was accomplished through common law.29 Con-
gress's first attempt in 1881 to legislate in the area of trade-
marks was unsuccessful, because the United States Constitu-
tion did not expressly recognize the subject matter of
trademarks alongside the other properties of patents and
copyrights." But, through the power of the Interstate Com-
merce Clause3 and the Necessary and Proper Clause," Con-
gress passed the Trade-Mark Act of 1905.2 Subsequently, in
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 1999); see also infra note 35.
28. See Shashank Upadhye, Trademark Surveys: Identifying the Relevant
Universe of Confused Consumers, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
549, 552 (1998).
29. See James M. Koelemay, Jr., Monetary Relief for Trademark Infringe-
ment Under the Lanham Act, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 458, 460 n.6 (1982) (citing
FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO
TRADE-MARKS (1925)). Koelemay states that "many of the rules governing
monetary relief in trademark actions are found nowhere within the four corners
of Section 35 (of the Lanham Act], but derive instead from the common
law...." Id. See also S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1276 (stating that "[t]he theory once prevailed that protec-
tion of trade-marks was entirely a state matter and that the right to a mark
was a common-law right").
30. The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution authorizes Con-
gress to adopt patent and copyright laws "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST., art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8. Trademark protection owes its judicial origin to federal and state
common law and later to the Interstate Commerce Clause, on which federal
trademark legislation and unfair competition is premised. See, e.g., 2 JAY
DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY §11.08[1]-[2] (1991).
31. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
32. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
33. The Trade-Mark Act of 1905 presented basic legislation under which
technical trademarks were registered and protected. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333,
at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275-76. Koelemay states,
"[tihe Trade-Mark Act of 1905 was the first federal statute to provide a compre-
hensive scheme of civil remedies." See Koelemay, supra note 29, at 474-75.
870 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
1946, Congress passed the Lanham Act to provide a structure
within which the common law of trademarks could be en-
forced at the federal level.34
The Lanham Act's scope of protection has increased since
its inception. The Act protects trademark owners in the ex-
clusive use of their trademarks35 when use by another would
be likely to cause confusion." Protection extends to federally
registered trademarks,37 unregistered trademarks, 8 and trade
"[The Act remained silent as to] scienter as a prerequisite for monetary relief,
and indeed the statute provided that upon a finding of infringement 'the com-
plainant shall be entitled to recover' profits and damages." See id.
34. See Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1999)); see also Robert, supra note 1.
35. Section 45 of The Lanham Act defines a trademark as:
[Any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof-
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce
and applies to register on the principal register established by this
Act,
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product,
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of
the goods, even if that source is unknown.
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
36. See Microsoft Corp. v. CMOS Technologies, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1329, 1335
(D.N.J. 1994).
37. To succeed in a claim for trademark infringement under Section 32 of
the Lanham Act, the owner of a valid and legally protectable mark must show
that an alleged infringer has used a confusingly similar mark. See 15 U.S.C. §
1114(1)(a). Section 32(1) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or color-
able imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, of-
fering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services
on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confu-
sion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; ...
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies here-
inafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
38. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act states, in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, sym-
bol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with an-
other person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the na-
ture, characteristics, qualities or geographic origin of his or her or
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dress.39 The underlying premise for protection is the need to
avoid consumer confusion among ordinary purchasers exercis-
ing ordinary cautions when buying in commerce."
another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
39. The trade dress of a product involves the total image of a product and
may include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, or
graphics. See John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966 (11th
Cir. 1983). Trade dress will be protected if the following elements are satisfied:
(a) Proof of non-functionality. This element is required only for unregis-
tered trade dress, not unregistered trademarks or trade names. See 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a).
(b) Proof of inherent distinctiveness.
(c) If not inherently distinctive at law or in fact, then proof of acquired "sec-
ondary meaning." When a trademark meets the threshold for distinctiveness,
then it warrants protection under the Lanham Act. The level of distinctiveness
is measured on a spectrum with a range of four categories: (1) arbitrary and
fanciful marks; (2) suggestive marks; (3) descriptive marks; and (4) generic
marks. The category in which a mark falls will determine its entitlement to
registration and protection. If a mark is classed as arbitrary, fanciful, or sug-
gestive, then it will be deemed inherently distinctive. But, if a mark is classed
as descriptive, then the trademark owner will be required to show that the
mark has acquired secondary meaning. Finally, at the generic end of the spec-
trum, a trademark owner will not be accorded trademark protection, because
generic marks merely identify a genus or type of goods as opposed to the trade-
mark operating as an indicator of the source of origin of the goods. See, e.g.,
DRATLER, supra note 30, § 9.02[2].
There are two major categories of trade dress. The first category of trade
dress is product packaging. The second category of trade dress is product de-
sign. The Supreme Court recently decided that unregistered product design or
configuration could not, at law, meet the test for inherent distinctiveness no
matter how unique or memorable the design may be. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). Therefore, to receive Lanham
Act protection for the infringement of unregistered product design, the propo-
nent of the design must demonstrate that the design acquired "secondary mean-
ing." The primary purpose of trade dress law is "to protect an owner of a dress
in informing the public of the source of its products, without permitting the
owner to exclude competition from functionally similar products." Jeffrey Mil-
stein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1995). The ma-
jor consideration for protection of unregistered product design is to distinguish
an unprotected general type of appearance from a protected appearance or de-
sign. See id. To consider product design or appearance protected, the product
design should rise above a certain level of generality, which can be described by
previous use of the design by manufacturers of other kinds of products. See id.
The product design has to be more than a general concept or idea that can or
has been applied to various products. See id.
40. Consumers are inundated with multiple demands on their time. To
avoid wasting time in the commercial arena, consumers rely on trademarks to
associate a product with a particular source. Consumer use of trademarks can
reduce shopping time thereby developing a use-benefit in the trademark for the
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B. Trademark Infringement
Infringement embodies the unauthorized use of the mark
of another, under circumstances that create confusion among
customers purchasing in the market place. 4' The touchstone
of trademark infringement is "the likelihood of confusion."42
Yet another cornerstone of trademark infringement is "the
likelihood of harm to reputation and goodwill," both of which
have economic consequences to the trademark owner who
faces potential infringement of her mark.43 Trademark in-
fringement does not depend upon the use of identical words,
nor whether they are so similar that a person looking at one
would be deceived into the belief that it was the other. In-
fringement exists if one adopts a trade name or a trademark,
so like another in form, spelling, or sound that one with an
unclear recollection of the real trademark is likely to become
confused or misled.44 Confusion cannot be reduced to a pre-
cise rule or measure. Confusion must be viewed from a total-
ity of the relevant circumstances, 5 taking into account the fol-
consumer. See generally Upadhye, supra note 28, at 552.
41. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127.
42. Courts rely on a multifactor test to measure the likelihood of confusion
for purposes of protecting a trademark, which represents the origin or source of
goods or services. The likelihood of confusion factors include:
a. The similarity of the marks;
b. The similarity of the goods or services;
c. The similarity of the trade channels;
d. The condition of the sale as either "impulse" or "considered";
e. The strength of the mark;
f. The number and nature of similar marks on similar goods;
g. The length of time of concurrent use without actual confusion; and
h. The variety of goods with which the mark is used.
See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961)
(multifactor test referred to as the "Polaroid test"); see also Morningside Group
v. Morningside Capital Group, 182 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1999).
43. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.
1961).
44. See Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495; see also Upadhye, supra note 28, at 553-
54.
45. Polaroid brought an action against Polarad alleging state and federal
trademark infringement and unfair competition for the defendant's use of the
name "Polarad." See Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 493. Polaroid owned the trademark
on the arbitrary name Polaroid as well as twenty-two related U.S. registrations
and one New York state registration. See id. In responding to Polaroid's in-
fringement claim, the Second Circuit pronounced the multifactor test now
known as the Polaroid likelihood of confusion factors. See id. at 495. The Sec-
ond Circuit did not apply the very test it pronounced, because the plaintiffs de-
lay in bringing the infringement action against the defendant barred the claim.
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lowing factors: the similarity in spelling, form, and sound of
the trademarks in question; the similarity of the products in-
volved; the prospective consumers that each product is mar-
keted and sold to; and the similarity between product pur-
chase conditions.46
Congress expanded a trademark owner's basis for recov-
ery beyond actual infringement. In 1995, Congress enacted
legislation to protect trademarks and trade dress from dilu-
tion.47 As recently as 1999, Congress extended the protection
for trademarks and, by extension, trade dress, to encompass
online piracy.48
See id. at 493, 495-96.
46. See Upadhye, supra note 28, at 561-64.
47. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109
Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)). Section 43(c) of the Lanham
Act states, in part:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles
of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an in-
junction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become fa-
mous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to
obtain such order of relief as is provided in this subsection ....
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
48. See Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
tit. III, 113 Stat. 1501A-545 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. V
1999)). Section 43(d) of the Lanham Act states, in pertinent part:
A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, includ-
ing a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if,
without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that person-
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a per-
sonal name which is protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that-
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of regis-
tration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar
to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly
similar to or dilutive of that mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of sec-
tion 706 of Title 18 or section 220506 of Title 36.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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III. PRE-LANHAM ACT TREATMENT OF THE ACCOUNTING OF
PROFITS REMEDY
A. Supreme Court Precedent and the Accounting of Profits
Remedy
As early as the turn of the twentieth century, the U.S.
Supreme Court had occasion to broach the issue of remedies
in equity and at law for the harm caused to a trademark
owner from the infringement by another.49 Although a busi-
ness interest is implicated in trademark infringement as op-
posed to a tangible property interest or bodily integrity as in
most common tort actions, the former is no less deserving of
protection and relief as are the latter. In this context, the
Supreme Court addressed in Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v.
Wolf Brothers Co.5" the question of whether a trademark
owner is entitled to equitable and monetary remedies, par-
ticularly, the legal remedy of an accounting of defendant's
profits." Plaintiff, the owner of the trademark "American
Girl" and the producer of ladies shoes, upon which that mark
was affixed, had its mark infringed by the defendant, whose
mark "American Lady" for competing products, was similar to
that of the trademark owner's mark.52 The Supreme Court
concluded that the plaintiffs mark was arbitrary and fanciful,
and not geographical and descriptive.5 The Court concluded
further that the defendant did infringe on the plaintiffs
mark.' Although the Trade-mark Act of 1905 predated this
decision, the Supreme Court rested its conclusion to affirm a
decision by the lower court to permit an accounting on the
prevailing analogous case law of the time."5
In Hamilton-Brown, the Supreme Court examined vari-
ous factors to determine whether to award an accounting of
defendant's profits." The Court was concerned that the case
provided very few facts with which to measure the actual
49. See, e.g., Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251
(1916); Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203
(1942); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
50. 240 U.S. 251 (1916).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 253.
53. See id. at 256-57.
54. See id. at 257.
55. See id. at 259-60.
56. See id. at 255, 261.
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damages the trademark infringer caused to the trademark
owner by virtue of the infringement. 7 In addition, the Court
considered who held the status as the more innocent party,
the trademark owner or the alleged infringer.5 Finally, the
Court considered the state of mind and the conduct of the al-
leged infringer with respect to the use of the trademark
owner's label to market the infringer's competing goods.59
With respect to this factor, the Court characterized the al-
leged infringer's conduct as wrongful and fraudulent, two
manifestations of a bad faith state of mind.6" Despite the
Court's allusion to the alleged infringer's knowledge that the
"American Girl" label belonged to another as a source-
identifying symbol, the Supreme Court did not pronounce a
rule of law in Hamilton-Brown that required a trademark
owner to make an affirmative showing of bad faith, either
through proof of fraud or wrongful conduct, to receive the
remedy of an accounting of a defendant-infringer's profits.6
The Court merely buttressed its decision to affirm this award
by employing the various factors it considered relevant to the
case. The factor of bad faith in the form of fraud or wrongful
conduct remained on equal footing with the two other factors
analyzed by the Court; the nonexistence of other measures of
actual damage to the trademark owner and status as the
62more innocent party.
57. See id. at 255. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of $1 nominal
damages, because the complainant declared that damages "were practically in-
capable of exact computation." Id.
58. See id. at 261. The Supreme Court, in castigating the defendant, in-
structed the jury to "remember that defendant does not stand as an innocent
infringer. [The] abundant evidence [supports] that the imitation of complain-
ant's mark was fraudulent." Id.
59. See id.
60. See id.; see also Koelemay, supra note 4, at 271-76 (providing a list of
twenty-two factors courts have deemed relevant to a bad faith inquiry).
61. See Hamilton-Brown, 240 U.S. at 261-62 (holding only that "the profits
included in the decree are confined to such accrued to defendant through its
persistence in the unlawful simulation in the face of the very plain notice of
complainant's rights that is contained in its bill").
62. The authors of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION seek
to minimize the force of Hamilton-Brown as precedent supporting the use of bad
faith as a factor to be considered in awarding the remedy of an accounting of
profits:
The decision of the Supreme Court in Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf
Bros. & Co., is sometimes read to authorize an accounting of defen-
dant's profits in all cases of infringement regardless of the defendant's
intent, although the Court in that case found that the defendant had
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Consistent with the factor approach taken in Hamilton-
Brown, the Supreme Court in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen
Manufacturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co.6" again established that
the remedy of an accounting of defendant's profits is, upon
the face of the decision, automatic or, at the very least, de-
pendent upon the facts and circumstances present in a
trademark infringement case.64 In this case, the trademark
owner sold complete shoes, which it manufactured, with a red
circular plug embedded in the center of the heel of the shoe.65
The infringer sold detached rubber heels, which were manu-
factured by other companies, upon which it affixed circular
plugs of red or reddish color so closely resembling the trade-
mark owner's mark that it was difficult to distinguish the
products sold by the infringer and those sold by the trade-
mark owner.66 The Supreme Court found significant the fact
that the infringer's use of a similar trademark, a circular red-
dish heel plug, on an inferior product would tarnish the
goodwill built up in the trademark owner's superior shoe
product.6" Equally important to the Court was the destruc-
tion of the trademark owner's power to direct consumers to its
products through identification with its mark as well as the
intentionally infringed the plaintiffs mark. However, the Supreme
Court denied an accounting [of profits] for trademark infringement in
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 cmt. c (1995) (citations
omitted).
The authors of the Restatement all but ignore the teachings of Hamilton-
Brown, which are to weigh the factual circumstances of each case of trademark
infringement to gauge the appropriateness of awarding the remedy of an ac-
counting of defendant's profits. Instead of explaining the impact of Hamilton-
Brown, the authors chose to identify the Supreme Court's decision in Champion,
which does support the position that some basis, like a defendant's willful palm-
ing-off or fraud, must be present before the courts award the remedy of an ac-
counting of profits. See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125
(1947). However, Champion can be criticized as, at worst, straying from read-
ing Hamilton-Brown as binding precedent or, at the very least, an example of
confused interpretation, thus allowing a reading of the holding in Champion as
requiring an affirmative showing of willful palming-off or fraud as opposed to
requiring a "basis for finding damage to the trademark owner and profit to the
infringer." Id.
63. 316 U.S. 203 (1942).
64. See id. at 206 ("Infringement and damage having been found, the Act [of
1905] requires the trade-mark owner to prove only sales of articles bearing the
infringing mark [for the award of profits].").
65. Id. at 203.
66. See id. at 204.
67. See id.
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trademark owner's loss of consumer goodwill previously asso-
ciated with its mark.68 In affirming the lower court's decision
to award the remedy of an accounting of defendant's profits,
the Supreme Court concluded that a narrow reading of the
rule allowing this remedy is not appropriate; rather, the
trademark owner is required to prove only the sales of arti-
cles bearing the infringing mark.69 Proving fraud was not a
prerequisite for the remedy; instead, the Court considered
product inferiority, loss of goodwill to the trademark owner,
and the possibility of a windfall to an infringer as justification
for awarding the remedy of an accounting of defendant's prof-
its.70
In his cursory dissent, Justice Black, with whom Justices
Douglas and Murphy concurred, first argued that no in-
fringement occurred because the trademark owner's product
was a completely manufactured shoe with the affixed trade-
mark, and the defendant's product was a detached rubber
heel having its own trademark." Justice Black concluded
that even if an economic rivalry did exist between the two
parties, the only remedy available would be injunctive relief
because the trademark owner failed to prove willful palming-
off or any evidence of actual injury." Without such proof,
Justice Black concluded that the remedy of an accounting
would grant a windfall to the trademark owner as well as im-
pose a penalty on the infringer. 3 Justice Black demonstrates
that the majority in Mishawaka did not intend to pronounce a
rule of law that would require a trademark owner prove an
infringer's bad faith as a prerequisite for receiving the rem-
edy of an accounting of profits. The language of the Trade-
mark Act of 1905, the statute under which Hamilton-Brown
and Mishawaka were decided, expresses the purpose of its
remedial provision as balancing the equities between the par-
ties in an infringement action.74 This balancing of the equi-
68. See id.
69. See id. at 206; see also supra note 64 (quoting Mishawaka).
70. See Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at 204.
71. See id. at 208 (Black, J., dissenting). The significance is a question of
fact. Justice Black sought to characterize the goods as non-competing, pre-
sumably to sway the Court to assume that no harm befell the petitioner in the
absence of diverted sales. See id.
72. See id. at 208-09.
73. See id. at 209.
74. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (repealed 1946); see Misha-
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ties in the Supreme Court's precedent does not require a
strict rule of a bad faith showing; rather, it requires a weigh-
ing of the facts and circumstances of a trademark infringe-
ment case before deciding the extent of a remedy and, specifi-
cally, a case-by-case determination of the appropriateness of
the accounting of profits remedy.
In his decision in Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders,75
Justice Douglas, who joined in the dissent in Mishawaka, ig-
nored Supreme Court precedent spanning almost three dec-
ades when he set forth a two-pronged rule of law to be applied
when an accounting of profits is being considered as a remedy
for trademark infringement. 6 The first prong of the rule sim-
ply requires a finding of infringement.77 Not as simply, the
second prong requires a basis for finding damage to the
trademark owner and profit to the infringer."8 This basis was
not just a showing of conduct giving rise to unfair competition
but, more pointedly, the basis referred back to Justice Doug-
las's mantra that an affirmative showing of willful palming-
off or fraud is a prerequisite for awarding the remedy of an
accounting of defendant's profits.79 Under Hamilton-Brown
and Mishawaka, the remedy of an accounting of defendant's
profits would probably have eluded the trademark owner in
Champion, because, pursuant to a totality of the circum-
stances analysis, the facts in Champion would have disclosed
that the infringer's use of the mark did not cause an appre-
waka, 316 U.S. at 206 n.1.
75. 331 U.S. 125 (1947). The trademark owner manufactured spark plugs
under the trademark Champion. See id. at 126. The infringer reconditioned
used spark plugs and retained the Champion trademark on the plugs and then
sold the reconditioned, used plugs in the second-hand market. See id. The
trademark owner alleged infringement and unfair competition. See id. The
lower and circuit courts agreed on the existence of infringement, but neither
permitted the remedy of an accounting of profits. See id. at 127.
76. See id. at 131. Justice Douglas stated as follows:
Mishawaka ... states the rule governing an accounting of profits where
a trademark has been infringed and where there is a basis for finding
damage to the plaintiff and profit to the infringer. But it does not
stand for the proposition that an accounting will be ordered merely be-
cause there has been an infringement.
Id. But see Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at 206; supra note 64 (quoting Mishawaka).
The Mishawaka decision can be parsed neatly into two parts. The first part
asked the question did infringement occur. The second part asked how will the
profit award be measured, not when will an accounting of profits be awarded.
77. See Champion, 331 U.S. at 131.
78. Id.
79. See id.
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ciable level of consumer confusion, nor did it cause significant
loss of goodwill.8" As such, Justice Douglas did not have to
formulate a bright-line test for the availability of an account-
ing of profits as a remedy for trademark infringement, be-
cause Supreme Court precedent aptly handled the balancing
of the equities using a totality of the circumstances test,
which more likely than not permitted the lower courts to
weigh more critically the respective rights of the parties in
controversy over the harm caused by trademark infringe-
ment.
B. Jurisprudential Bases for Recovery of Accounting of
Profits
When courts sat in equity and at law, their jurisdiction to
award remedies was critical to proper judicial administration.
Because most trademark infringement and unfair competi-
tion claims require the issuance of injunctions, equity courts
were the appropriate forums to institute these actions. Eq-
uity courts, in an effort to do complete justice, would award
monetary relief, specifically an accounting of profits, to
achieve judicial economy.8' Equity courts traditionally
awarded an accounting of a defendant's profits to a trade-
mark owner in those circumstances when the owner provided
proof of harm or damage." The purpose of equity was to com-
pensate a trademark owner for the losses suffered as a result
of a defendant's infringing activity by treating the infringer's
80. Compare id. at 131-32 (finding an injunction was an adequate remedy
against vendor of reconditioned spark plugs because there was no showing of
fraud or palming off and "the likelihood of damage to petitioner or profit to re-
spondents due to any misrepresentation seems slight"), with Hamilton-Brown
Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 260 (1916) (allowing recovery of
profits only and excluding "all sales where the term 'American Lady' was ac-
companied with any other matter clearly indicating that such shoes were the
manufacture of Hamilton-Brown Shoe Company"), and Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at
204-05 (finding where "it is difficult to distinguish the products sold by the de-
fendant [infringer] from the plaintiffs [owner's] products" such as to destroy the
owner's good will and create a "reasonable likelihood" of confusion among con-
sumers, in assessing defendant's profits, "the plaintiff shall be required to prove
defendant's sales only").
81. See Corgill, supra note 26, at 1918-19 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. b (1995) for the proposition that "[c]ourts in eq-
uity may have first awarded accountings because of concerns for judicial econ-
omy, but these courts also justified the recovery of the infringer's profits as com-
pensatory").
82. See id.
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profits as a surrogate measure of the trademark owner's lost
profits."3
Following the merger of courts of equity and law and af-
ter the paradigm shift from the application of tort principles
for loss of sales due to infringement, to property principles to
protect a trademark owner's interest in his valuable intangi-
ble asset, compensation theory alone was no longer adequate
to justify the accounting of profits remedy.84 Accordingly, the
courts have elevated the unjust enrichment theory and, to a
lesser extent, the deterrence theory, to justify awarding the
accounting of profits remedy.85
1. Unjust Enrichment
Unjust enrichment is a widely accepted theory of recov-
ery for trademark infringement.86 According to this theory of
recovery, an alleged infringer who uses the trademark of an-
other to make a profit should not be permitted to benefit from
such conduct.87 The unauthorized use of the mark to make a
profit results in an unjust enrichment to the infringer. To
remedy this inequity, the infringer becomes liable as a trustee
for the profits he accrues from his infringing conduct. Thus,
an adequate remedy is fashioned from the profits of the in-
fringer.
Some courts and commentators insist that applying a
theory of unjust enrichment only provides a windfall to the
trademark owner by virtue of his interest in his mark.8 Still,
other courts and commentators challenge, and even reject,
the notion that the prevention of unjust enrichment is a suffi-
83. See id.
84. See id. at 1925.
85. See id. at 1928-31.
86. See William G. Barber, Recovery of Profits Under the Lanham Act: Are
the District Courts Doing Their Job?, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 141, 158-62 (1992)
("Many cases discuss unjust enrichment as a theory upon which to base an
award of profits . . . ."); see also Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l,
Inc., 951 F.2d 684, 694 (5th Cir. 1992). Texas Pig Stands is a particularly hu-
morous decision authored by Circuit Judge Sam D. Johnson, who accepted a
jury instruction defining unjust enrichment as the "unjust retention of a benefit
to the loss of another or unjust retention of money or property of another which
is against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience."
Texas Pig Stands, 951 F.2d at 694 & n.15.
87. See Barber, supra note 86, at 159.
88. See, e.g., Koelemay, supra note 29, at 541 (arguing that "[tlo avoid wind-
falls and to attempt a closer approach to justice, courts from time to time have
imposed threshold criteria on award of profits").
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cient rationale for awarding an accounting of defendant's
profits in the case of trademark infringement.89  Neither of
these challenges nor convictions is without logical flaws. The
first contention ignores a converse windfall to the infringer
when recovery for infringement becomes elusive due to the
difficulty of proving actual damages. But more critically, the
second contention disregards the underlying policy support-
ing the Lanham Act's remedy provision, which is that trade-
marks have property value, both tangible and intangible. °
An aim of the Lanham Act's remedy provision is to
achieve a level of fairness and equity between those whose
trademark and attendant business interests have been
harmed and those who have caused the harm, either inno-
cently or deliberately, willfully, or fraudulently.91 Another
express goal is to provide a measure of recovery for a trade-
mark owner who is otherwise unable to prove actual damages
due to a lack of access to the infringer's business records in
order to determine the motive for the infringement, the re-
source and monetary investment in the infringement, and the
exact profits obtained as a result of the infringement.92 Still
another policy of the Lanham Act's remedy provision is to
make infringement an unprofitable venture.93
89. See id. at 491 (noting that in 1965, the Second Circuit, in Monsanto
Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prod. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, "refused to recognize
property rights in trademarks, and thus recovery on an unjust enrichment the-
ory was unavailable").
90. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274
(explaining that one of the purposes underlying any trademark statute is recog-
nizing an owner's interest when he has spent energy, time, and money in pre-
senting to the public the product, and he then should be protected in his in-
vestment from its appropriation by pirates and cheats).
91. See Keith M. Stolte, Remedying Judicial Limitations on Trademark
Remedies: An Accounting of Profits Should Not Require a Finding of Bad Faith,
87 TRADEMARK REP. 271, 298 (1997) (arguing "that Congress intended the com-
pensatory remedies provided for in Section 35 of the Lanham Act, particularly
profits, to apply to all... infringers regardless of [their] intent").
92. See Corgill, supra note 26, at 1941-51. Professor Corgill explains that a
trademark infringer benefits financially from infringing activity by avoiding
fixed cost marketing efforts, increased revenues and sales, increased presence of
brands in retail outlets, and augmented reputation. See id. at 1950. Therefore,
while the infringer receives windfalls from the infringing activity, it is likely
that he is not documenting these benefits in his accounting ledger. See id.
93. See Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that an accounting of profits has been determined by the Eleventh Circuit to
further the congressional purpose by making trademark infringement unprofit-
able, and is justified because it deprives the defendant of unjust enrichment and
provides a deterrent to similar activity in the future).
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In a democratic, market-driven society, healthy competi-
tion for the most part ensures product quality, availability,
and affordability in the market place; however, unfair compe-
tition, including trademark infringement, tends to have a
deleterious impact on a market economy.94 Thus, it is critical
for competition laws, like the trademark infringement remedy
provision, to protect the interests of all parties converging on
the marketplace. Such complete protection necessitates a de-
cision to award the remedy of an accounting of defendant's
profits attributable to unauthorized use of the trademark of
another, if only to protect the integrity of the marketplace by
ensuring stability and consistency in the treatment of market
participants. The remedy of an accounting of profits is the
very insurance required to instill faith in the competitive
marketplace. Under the theory of unjust enrichment, it
should not matter greatly that a trademark owner would not
have used her mark to obtain the level of profits squeezed out
by an infringer, because the very nature of infringement
mandates a degree of cunning to exploit the value of a trade-
mark in an unexpected profit area for a minimum duration.
Rather, the focus of the disgorgement of profits should be
placed squarely upon the infringer, who has invaded the in-
terests of another for his own personal gain. It matters not
that payments to ensure marketplace integrity inure to the
trademark owner, as he is the party most injured by the un-
authorized conduct of the infringer.
At the very least, the unjust enrichment theory accom-
plishes three goals. The first goal is increasing confidence in
a democratic market economy. The second goal is providing a
system of redress, which adequately and equitably ensures
monetary relief for all parties directly and indirectly affected
by trademark infringement. Finally, the third goal is estab-
lishing parameters for what is considered appropriate com-
petitive conduct in the exploitation of a trademark. These
goals and policies support unjust enrichment as a theory of
recovery of the disgorgement of defendant's profits for trade-
mark infringement, that range from innocent, deliberate or
94. See David J. Gerber, The Transformation of European Community Com-
petition Law, 35 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 97 (1994) (summarizing that the generic
benefits of competition and competition laws include lower prices, more rapid
technological progress, and, in the case of the European Community, a unified
market).
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willful, to fraudulent in character.
2. Deterrence
Deterrence is another theory of recovery for trademark
infringement,95 and possesses a dual character. Deterrence
theory is invoked as either a penalty or a prod. To impose a
penalty in response to certain conduct is to require an actor to
pay more than mere compensation to ameliorate the harm re-
sulting from such conduct.96 In essence, the actor is being
punished to either make a stark example of the conduct, or to
reward an injured party who took on the status of a private
attorney general to protect his interests and society at large
from the future harms of unregulated conduct. As a prod, de-
terrence theory discourages an actor or groups of actors from
engaging in specific types of conduct. Justifiably, the deter-
rence theory supports the regulation of future deleterious
conduct through negative encouragement. Because the
Lanham Act's remedy provision proscribes imposing penalties
in trademark infringement cases,97 the deterrence theory
supporting the award of a defendant's profits must rely on the
future regulation of conduct principle in order to remain true
to congressional intent.
Deterrence theory in trademark and unfair competition
law has the capability of protecting future or developing mar-
kets through active policing against potential economic harm
resulting from innocent, deliberate or willful, or fraudulent
infringement.98 With very few exceptions, trademark in-
95. See Koelemay, supra note 4, at 277 ("In 1965, the Second Circuit
adopted deterrence as a third distinct rationale,... [and other] courts fre-
quently have stated in dictum that one of the policies underlying the remedies
afforded by the Lanham Act is to deter infringement and thereby protect the
public.").
96. See id.
97. See id. ("Section 35, however, requires that monetary awards 'shall con-
stitute compensation and not a penalty."'); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (Supp. V
1999). Professor Dennis Corgill has documented that "numerous courts have
recognized that deterrence is achieved by making infringement unprofitable."
See Corgill, supra note 26, at 1926 n.77. He cites numerous cases to support
this proposition. See, e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990); Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875
F.2d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 1989); Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co.,
754 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1985).
98. See Corgill, supra note 26, at 1928 (stating "that Lanham Act remedies,
like tort remedies in general, should protect the public interest and deter future
misconduct. Courts following this view caution, for example, that 'monetary re-
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fringement in the modern era is accomplished with greater
information available regarding the similarity of trademarks
and the businesses to which they are associated. In the cur-
rent technology-driven economy, registration is not the only
means to provide notice of the adoption and use of trade-
marks or trade dress. Notice can be accomplished through
the most cursory of searches of both registered and unregis-
tered trademarks.99 Most businesses have access to legal
sources and research sources to isolate competing products as
well as valuable trademarks. This information can be readily
employed to determine those products and trademarks cur-
rently in use by another. By prodding or warning potential
infringers of the consequences of infringement through appli-
cation of deterrence theory, the accounting of profits remedy
is a capable tool to discourage prospective harm that infring-
ers can cause to their competitors, the market economy, and
the purchasing public.
3. Compensation
Compensation is the third and final theory of recovery for
trademark infringement.' ° Of the three, compensation is
lief... must be great enough to [deter] infringement but must not be so large as
to constitute a penalty'").
99. A trademark search can be conducted for free on the Internet by visiting
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's Web site, http://www.uspto.gov. Or else
the Patent and Trademark Depository Libraries, available in every state, may
be visited. These libraries offer a combination of hardcover directories of feder-
ally registered marks and an online database of both registered marks and
marks for which a registration application is pending. Most of these libraries
also have step-by-step instructions for searching registered and pending marks.
In addition to searching for registered or pending marks, one may also use
product guides and other materials available in these libraries to search for pos-
sibly conflicting marks that have not been registered. This can be important
because an existing mark, even if it is unregistered, would preclude registering
the same or confusingly similar mark in one's own name, and using the mark in
any part of the country or commercial transaction where customers might be
confused. See Nolo.com, Inc., Conducting a Trademark Search, at
http://www.nolo.com/lawcenter/ency/article.cfni/objectic79BB0841_5898.40C3-
A441E98A7494A853/catID/D8932879-DC34-43DF-BF65FC92D55FEE5D (last
visited Feb. 19, 2002). See also International Star Class Yacht Racing Associa-
tion. v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 753 (2d Cir. 1996), in which
the court found that the defendant's search "was limited solely to registered or
applied-for federal trademarks; despite its attorneys' advice that a wider search
be conducted .... ." Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was not convinced "that
such a limited search should exonerate Hilfiger, particularly when Hilfiger ig-
nored the specific advice of its attorneys to search more thoroughly." Id.
100. See Koelemay, supra note 4, at 277.
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probably the theory that is most acceptable to the courts, but
least effective to those injured by trademark infringement.'
In early trademark infringement legislation, compensation
theory was the only basis for recovery in trademark infringe-
ment actions.0 2 Under this theory, trademark owners injured
by the infringement of others are reimbursed only their ac-
tual losses.' 3 Compensation theory imposed an extreme bur-
den on trademark owners, who were left without sufficient
remedies in circumstances where actual damages became im-
possible to prove because of the sheer speculation about the
degree and extent of harm caused by the infringement.0
Compensation theory also changes the nature of trademark
protection because it adds a second causation requirement in
order to recover a monetary remedy.' For instance, an
owner of a trademark who is infringed by another must first
prove the element of "likelihood of confusion" before in-
fringement will become actionable.' 6 After determining that
another's infringement is actionable, and before monetary re-
lief is recoverable, compensation theory would require the
trademark owner to prove that the infringer's conduct caused
a certain amount of damage.' 7 Thus, compensation theory, as
the only basis for recovery, creates a dual barrier to the ac-
counting of profits remedy by requiring proof of causation,
implicit in both the likelihood of confusion element and the
entitlement to only actual losses. As discussed in Parts IV
and VI of this article, Congress could not have intended a
trademark owner to meet such a high level of proof before re-
ceiving an infringer's profits.
101. See id. Koelemay explains that the first purpose for the award of dam-
ages or profits was for the compensation to plaintiff for losses. He explains that
this was the sole basis for recovery under the statutory predecessors of the Sec-
tion 35 of the Lanham Act. See id.
102. See id. According to Koelemay, Section 35 combined the damages provi-
sions in sections 16 and 19 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, presumably to reflect
the merger of law and equity. See Koelemay, supra note 29, at 459.
103. See id.
104. See Corgill, supra note 26, at 1923-24.
105. See id. at 1921.
106. See id. at 1921-22.
107. See id. at 1919-20.
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IV. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF THE LANHAM ACT'S
REMEDY PROVISION
Statutory protection of trademarks met several hurdles
before crossing over into the fraternal patchwork of protec-
tions for intellectual property. In 1870, Congress first at-
tempted to legislate on the subject of trademarks."8 At the
time, Congress did not really distinguish between types of in-
tellectual property when it interpreted article I, section 8,
clause 8 of the United States Constitution. 9 This failure to
differentiate trademarks from both patents and copyrights
led to the demise of Congress's attempts to exercise its au-
thority over trademark subject matter."°  With the Trade-
Mark Cases decision,"' the Supreme Court struck down Con-
gress's interpretation of its authority to legislate in the
trademark arena.' Having learned from its mistake in 1870,
Congress was successful in its 1881 attempt to regulate
trademark subject matter by expressly linking the trademark
statute to its authority to regulate interstate commerce."11
This ultimately led to a subsequent trademark statute called
the Act of 1920"1 and to the present Trademark Act, com-
monly known as the Lanham Act."5 The Lanham Act pro-
vides for two remedies following a finding of infringement-
injunction and monetary relief. The most generally applied
remedy is injunctive relief pursuant to Section 34, which
states:
108. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198; see also Robert, supra note 1,
at 373.
109. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879) (stating that although
Congress was apparently of the opinion that its power to regulate trademarks
was found in article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, "[any at-
tempt... to identify the essential characteristics of a trade-mark with inven-
tions and discoveries in the arts and sciences, or with the writings of authors,
will show that the effort is surrounded with insurmountable difficulties").
110. See Robert, supra note 1, at 373-74.
111. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
112. See id. at 94 ("While such legislation may be a judicious aid to the com-
mon law on the subject of trade-marks, and may by within the competency of
legislatures whose general powers embrace that class of subjects, we are unable
to see any such power in the constitutional provision concerning authors and
inventors, and their writings and discoveries."); see also Robert, supra note 1, at
374.
113. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502 (repealed 1946); see Robert, su-
pra note 1, at 374.
114. See Robert, supra note 1, at 374.
115. Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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Section 1116. Injunctive Relief
(a) Jurisdiction; service
The several courts vested with jurisdiction of civil ac-
tions arising under this chapter shall have power to grant
injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon
such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent
the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark regis-
tered in the Patent and Trademark Office or to prevent a
violation under subsection (a), (c), or (d) of section 1125 of
this title."
6
The other statutory remedy, monetary relief, is included
in Section 35 of the Lanham Act. Section 35 states:
Section 1117. Recovery for violation of rights; profits,
damages and costs; attorney fees; treble damages:
(a) When a violation of any right of the registrant of a
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a
violation under section 1125(a), (c), or (d) of this title, or a
willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title, shall
have been established in any civil action arising under this
chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provi-
sions of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to
the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits,
(2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) costs of
the action. The court shall assess such profits and dam-
ages or cause the same to be assessed under its direction.
In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove
defendant's sales only; defendant must prove all elements
of cost or deduction claimed. In assessing damages the
court may enter judgment, according to the circumstances
of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual
damages, not exceeding three times such amount. If the
court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on
profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its
discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall
find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case.
Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall con-
stitute compensation and not a penalty. The court in ex-
ceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.117
With its enactment of sections 1116 and 1117(a), Con-
116. Id. § 1116.
117. Id. § 1117 (emphasis added).
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gress intended these remedial provisions to protect trade-
mark owners from infringement. First, Congress authorized
courts to enjoin the activities of a person who infringes on the
mark of another.1 8 Second, and central to this article, Con-
gress expressly authorized, inter alia, relief in the form of an
accounting of defendant's profits.' This relief is only limited
by the court's adherence to the principles of equity. Congress
did not impose any other prerequisites, like bad faith, on the
remedy of an accounting of profits. Third, and conjunctive
with an accounting of profits, Congress expressed the intent
to permit the assessment of damages, premised upon a con-
cept deriving from tort remedies. 2 ° Fourth, and conjunctive
with damages and an accounting of profits, Congress deemed
costs of an action recoverable.' Finally, Congress authorized
the recovery of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party, either trademark owner or alleged infringer, but only
to the extent that the court deems the case to be exceptional
in its circumstances.' Despite the breadth and reach of the
remedy provisions, Congress tempered these provisions by
proscribing the use of the stated recovery tools to assess pen-
alties on an infringer.'23 No doubt, Congress took this position
118. See id. § 1116(a).
119. See id. § 1117(a).
120. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 717, General State-
ment of Conditions of Infringement; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 766B cmt. b, Intentional Interference With Prospective
Contractual Relation (stating that "liability was imposed upon one who diverted
another's business by fraudulently palming off his own goods as those of the
other, or by infringing another's trademark or trade name"); but see Biebow &
Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 431, n.10 (5th Cir. 1984), citing 2 J. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 25.1 (1973) ("In modern law, the ne-
cessity for any 'wrongful intent' on the infringer's part has become totally un-
necessary [sic] for a court to find trademark infringement .... Thus, the policy
has shifted from punishing infringers who have evil intentions to protecting the
public from being confused by the use of similar marks."). See Corgill, supra
note 26, at 1918 ("Common law courts first granted accountings by reasoning
that an infringer's profits are a surrogate measure of the trademark holder's
own lost profits."); see also Bryan M. Otake, Comment, The Continuing Viability
of the Deterrence Rationale in Trademark Infringement Accountings, 5 U.C.L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 221, 234 ("An accounting has historically been viewed as 'a surro-
gate for plaintiff's lost profits' or a proxy for exact measurement of damages in a
complex market.").
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(3).
122. See id.
123. See id. § 1117 (making recovery subject to principles of equity, granting
the court discretion if it finds the amount awarded inadequate or excessive, and
finally stating "[sluch sum.., shall constitute compensation not a penalty").
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in the spirit of balancing the equities between parties in con-
troversy as well as maintaining the equilibrium between ap-
propriate and inappropriate use of another's trademark,
which is protected as a registered mark, an unregistered
mark, or by the principles of unfair competition.'
While the rules guiding the recovery for trademark in-
fringement may appear uncomplicated, commentators cor-
rectly recognize "that monetary recovery in infringement
cases remains 'a confusing melange of common law and eq-
uity principles." 12' The confusion can be attributed to the
parts of the Lanham Act remedy provisions that subject re-
covery to "principles of equity," or that instruct a court that it
"may enter judgment [on an assessment of damages] accord-
ing to the circumstances of the case," or that permit a court to
use "its discretion" in the face of "inadequate or excessive" re-
covery such as to enter a just judgment by employing the
tools of additur or remittitur."6  From these statements,
courts have fashioned myriad, often divergent requirements
for trademark owners to meet to recover the express remedies
listed in § 1116 and, especially § 1117(a), the recovery of an
accounting of profits.
V. THE FUNCTION OF BAD FAITH IN THE AWARD OF AN
ACCOUNTING OF PROFITS
A. Bad Faith as a Factor in the Award of an Accounting of
Profits
Although the language is less than precise, the Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits
in their decisions about the role of bad faith in the award of
an accounting of profits tend to adhere to the balance of the
124. See DRATLER, supra note 30, §11.02.
[Tihe common law of unfair competition provides protection for unreg-
istered trademarks... as long as they meet the fundamental require-
ments for protection. Although common law in the United States is
largely the law of the individual states, Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act subsumes and federalizes much of this common law protection for
unregistered marks. Thus, at common law, protection from unfair
competition begins when a mark ... is first used in commerce.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763 (1992).
125. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §30.58.
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
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equities approach in permitting or affirming monetary
awards, specifically disgorgement of an infringer's profits. By
no means are the decisions of the circuits harmonious, but
whether expressed or implied, analytical or conclusory, fair or
inequitable, these decisions reflect a judicial attempt to bal-
ance various factors, as opposed to applying a bright line rule,
to determine the appropriateness of the award of the account-
ing remedy.
Of the circuits applying a balancing of the equities ap-
proach, the Seventh Circuit's jurisprudence is most consistent
with the plain meaning of the remedy provision of the
Lanham Act. The Seventh Circuit explains that the primary
function of a trial court presiding over a trademark infringe-
ment action is to "make violations of the Lanham Act unprof-
itable to the infringing party."'27 To meet this obligation, the
Seventh Circuit cautions that monetary relief "must be great
enough to further the statute's goal of discouraging trade-
mark infringement, but must not be so large as to constitute a
penalty.""'  In its quest to give the Lanham Act remedy pro-
vision its true meaning, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the
language "subject to the principles of equity" to encompass a
broader view of a district court's discretion to balance the
considerations present in each case alleging trademark in-
fringement."' Thus, the Seventh Circuit instructs:
127. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 744 (7th
Cir. 1985). The court held that monetary recovery for admitted trademark in-
fringement included an accounting of the infringer's profits that was not
awarded as a penalty and the award of attorneys' fees, because of the defen-
dant's targeting of plaintiff as the "whetstone upon which it has unfairly sharp-
ened its competitive weapons." Id. at 746.
128. Id. at 744.
129. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., quoting 2 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30.25, at
498 (2d ed. 1984), for the proposition that "[t]o obtain an accounting of profits,
the courts usually require that defendant's infringement infer some connotation
of 'intent,' or a knowing act denoting an intent, to infringe or reap the harvest of
another's mark and advertising," but noting that Seventh Circuit law "is not,
however, so limited." Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d
947, 961 (7th Cir. 1992). The court found that, in fact, a broader view of the
statute "is more consistent with the language of the Lanham Act than is the
narrower (though perhaps more logical) rule espoused by [the defendant]." Id.
The Seventh Circuit found defendant's urging of the narrower view more logical
as confined to the specific facts of Sands because of the following: first, the
trademark owner alleged and proved reverse confusion, where a larger, well
known, junior user sought to trade on the goodwill and reputation of the
smaller, less known, senior user who, in spite of this paradoxical juxtaposition,
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The Lanham Act specifically provides for the awarding of
profits in the discretion of the judge subject only to princi-
ples of equity .... Other than general equitable consid-
erations, there is no express requirement that the parties
be in direct competition or that the infringer willfully in-
fringe the trade dress [or trademark of another] to justify
an award of profits .... Profits are awarded under differ-
ent rationales including unjust enrichment, deterrence,
and compensation .... Where a plaintiff seeks an award
of damages [under a compensation theory], plaintiff must
show that a defendant's infringement caused those losses.
Here, however, an award of profits was appropriate under
either a deterrence or unjust enrichment theory even if
plaintiffs actual sustained losses may have been less.
130
The Seventh Circuit first recognizes that the remedy pro-
vision is surrounded by other statutory language providing
more imposing monetary remedies against those who trade on
a counterfeit mark;..' therefore, the remedies contained in the
remains entitled to the use of its trademark; and second, the trademark owner
had not used its trademark on the same or similar type of product that defen-
dant used the mark to promote, even though the plaintiff made other uses of the
mark. See id. at 961, 963. Based upon these two significant factors, the Sev-
enth Circuit, while agreeing that an accounting of defendant's profits could be
awarded, concluded "[iun such a case, an award of $24 million in profits is not
'equitable'; rather, it is a windfall to the plaintiff." Id. at 963.
[The defendant] may have been unjustly enriched by using [the plain-
tiffs] mark without paying for it, but the award of profits bears no rela-
tionship to that enrichment. A reasonable royalty, perhaps related in
some way to the fee [the plaintiff] was paid by [the licensee], would
more accurately reflect both the extent of [the defendant's] unjust en-
richment and the interest of [the plaintiff] that has been infringed.
Id. at 963. In spite of the special factors in the Sands case, one concurring
judge stated that the district court, in the exercise of its discretion, might well
place substantial emphasis on deterrence, id. at 963-64, while the Senior Circuit
Judge dissented and stated:
[Tihe real question, ... is one of causation. What portion of [defen-
dant's] profit resulted from its use of [the trademark], and therefore
constituted unjust enrichment? I am unable to say that the district
court's estimate of 10% was unreasonable or clearly erroneous. [The
defendant] made no showing that it should have been a different num-
ber. The 90% ($216 million) of profit which [the defendant] retains is
no paltry reward for everything it contributed to the success of the ven-
ture.
Id. at 964.
130. Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989) (cita-
tions omitted).
131. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (Supp. V 1999) (providing that an infringer's in-
tentional use of a counterfeit mark will subject that infringer to damages for
three times profits or damages, whichever is greater, together with a reasonable
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general remedy provision should not be read as calling for the
same quantum of proof that is required for the more imposing
remedies, which are only available for specific infringing con-
duct. Second, the language "subject to the principles of eq-
uity" should be given its general meaning that allows for a
case-by-case determination, not one based upon satisfying a
bright line rule that must be met before the remedy provision
can be applied. Third, the surrounding express statutory
language, requiring proof of willfulness for monetary recovery
in dilution actions, 132 cases requesting attorneys' fees,' and
actions against a domain name registrar,' negates applica-
tion of this very same requirement in standard trademark in-
fringement cases, where the remedy provision and the protec-
tion provisions for registered and unregistered trademarks
are silent about any bad faith requirement for monetary relief
upon proof of trademark infringement or unfair competition.
The Eleventh Circuit applies similar reasoning to justify
its factor approach to assess the appropriateness of awarding
the accounting remedy. Modern application of the Lanham
Act remedy provision by the Eleventh Circuit appeared in
Wesco Manufacturing, Inc. v. Tropical Attractions of Palm
Beach, Inc.135 In Wesco, the defendant used the trademark
owner's mark to advertise and sell its goods even after the
trademark owner properly canceled its licensing agreement
with the defendant." 6 The district court found that the de-
fendant violated the Lanham Act, and thus enjoined defen-
dant's use of the trademark owner's mark, but it did not
award monetary relief.'37 In reversing the district court, the
Eleventh Circuit held that denial of an accounting was error
and a remand was necessary for the determination of the
profits defendant derived from the infringement.' 8 To sup-
port its reversal, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "[t]he
measure of recovery under section 35 includes the defendant's
profits, any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and costs.' ' 9
attorney's fee).
132. See id. § 1125(c).
133. See id. § 1117(a).
134. See id. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(ii).
135. 833 F.2d 1484 (11th Cir. 1987).
136. See id. at 1485-86.
137. See id. at 1486.
138. See id. at 1488.
139. Id. at 1487.
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The Eleventh Circuit squarely addressed the defendant's ar-
gument that the trademark owner did not sustain any dam-
ages and, as such, should not be entitled to monetary relief,
specifically an accounting of profits. The court noted that "[a]
plaintiff need not demonstrate actual damage to obtain an ac-
counting of an infringer's profits under section 35 of the
Lanham Act."4° Instead, all that the statute requires is that
the trademark owner prove the infringer's sales.'
The Eleventh Circuit received another opportunity to so-
lidify its position that the Lanham Act remedy provision does
not require proof of bad faith before awarding an accounting
in Burger King Corp. v. Mason.4' The appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit, actually the second appeal to arise out of the litiga-
tion that spanned nearly a decade, was made in regard to the
determination of the appropriate relief awarded under the
Lanham Act with respect to the defendant's infringement of
the Burger King trademark.143 Affirming its prior decisions
that section 35 does not require a plaintiff to demonstrate ac-
tual damages to obtain an award reflecting an infringer's
profits, the appellate body went on to state, "[nior is an award
of profits based on either unjust enrichment or deterrence de-
pendent upon a higher showing of culpability on the part of
defendant, who is purposely using the trademark."' In 1999,
the Eleventh Circuit spoke again in Burger King Corp. v.
Weaver 4' reasoning that, although the remedy could provide a
windfall to a trademark owner, the principal focus of the
remedy is to deter infringement by making it unprofitable
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1488.
142. 855 F.2d 779 (11th Cir. 1988).
143. See id. at 780 (noting the court's prior decision in Burger King Corp. v.
Mason, 710 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1983)).
144. Burger King, 855 F.2d at 781. The Eleventh Circuit buttressed its 1988
decision by reiterating that "no hard and fast rules dictate the form or quantum
of relief' in a trademark infringement action. Id. at 783 (quoting a response to
the defendant's argument that an award of profits would be improper, made in
Burger King, 710 F.2d at 1495 n.ll). The court unambiguously expressed the
higher showing of culpability for the award of attorneys' fees by referencing the
statutory language requiring proof that the infringement case is "exceptional."
Id. at 781 (citing 15 U.S.C. §1117(a)). The court intended to contrast the limited
degree of discretion afforded a trial judge in cases where there was a request for
award of attorneys' fees with the broad discretion afforded a trial judge in cases
where a trademark owner requested that the infringer be made to disgorge prof-
its. See id.
145. 169 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 1999).
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and to deprive infringers of unjust enrichment. 146 In all of its
precedent, the Eleventh Circuit has remained firmly rooted in
its position that the principles of equity supporting the
Lanham Act remedy of an accounting in no way requires spe-
cific proof of bad faith. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit chooses
to review each case on its merits to determine if the district
courts, in their wide discretion, are fashioning monetary relief
consistent with the purposes of the Lanham Act and commen-
surate with the infringer's conduct. If a bad faith require-
ment were read into the remedy provision, the additur or re-
mitittur language instructing the trial judge to exercise his
discretion would become meaningless; a trademark owner
could be denied recovery of an accounting where an infringer
has been unjustly enriched, merely because the infringer
cannot be deemed to have acted in bad faith. The Eleventh
Circuit recognized that Congress did not intend for an in-
fringer's invasion of a trademark owner's property interest to
be excused merely because the infringer did not act deliber-
ately or willfully or, even more perplexing, when an ineffi-
cient infringer failed to turn a profit from his infringing con-
duct.
147
The Ninth Circuit has expressly rejected bad faith as a
requirement before permitting an award of the accounting of
profits remedy. In Faberge, Inc. v. Saxony Products Inc.,148
the Ninth Circuit held that "[w]illful infringement may sup-
port an award of profits to the plaintiff, but does not require
one."'49 No language more plainly illustrates that willfulness
or bad faith is one factor to be weighed by the district court.
In analyzing when an accounting will be awarded, the Fa-
berge panel looked to the oft-cited Maier Brewing Co. v.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp."' Maier was a Lanham Act
trademark infringement case in which the producer of "Black
& White" scotch sought to protect its name from use by the
producer of "Black & White" beer, the latter deemed by the
appellate court to affect adversely the sales and reputation of
146. See id. at 1321.
147. See id. ("An accounting for profits has been determined by this Court to
further the Congressional purpose by making infringement unprofitable ...
see also 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (Supp. V 1999).
148. 605 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1979).
149. Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
150. 390 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1968).
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the former. 5' In Maier, the Ninth Circuit culled the legisla-
tive history of the Lanham Act remedy provision, digested the
Supreme Court's decision in Mishawaka, and analyzed the
Second Circuit's decision in Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect
Fit Products Manufacturing Co., to arrive at a conclusion em-
bracing the unjust enrichment theory to support an award of
an accounting of profits. 52 Specifically, the Maier Court con-
sidered the following:
"It seems scarcely equitable . . .for an infringer to
reap the benefits of a trade-mark he has stolen, force
the registrant to the expense and delay of litigation,
and then escape payment of damages on the theory
that the registrant suffered no loss. To impose on the
infringer nothing more serious than an injunction
when he is caught is a tacit invitation to other in-
fringement."
... In those cases where there is infringement, but no
direct competition, [making trademark infringement un-
profitable] can be accomplished by the use of an account-
ing of profits based on unjust enrichment rationale....
All this, of course, would be carried out subject to the
principles of equity. In certain cases an injunction will
fully effectuate the policies of the Act; others will arise
when there will be sufficient provable damages to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act without the granting of an ac-
counting of profits; and in still other cases only the grant-
ing of an accounting of profits will effectuate the policies of
the Act.
153
It is apparent from the court's pronouncements that Ninth
Circuit precedent requires a factor approach to analyzing the
accounting of profits issue. Ninth Circuit teachings instruct
its district courts to make "any violations of the Lanham Act
unprofitable""4 to the infringing parties by considering the
purpose and the function of the Lanham Act and then weigh-
ing the relevant conditions that would make an award of an
151. Id. at 120.
152. See id. at 121-23 (discussing Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods.
Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965)).
153. Id. at 123-24 (quoting Admiral Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores, Inc., 141
F. Supp. 796, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1956)).
154. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., 692 F.2d 1272, 1274
(9th Cir. 1982). The Playboy court does not make discernable distinctions be-
tween innocent infringers, willful infringers, or deliberate infringers.
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infringer's profits appropriate. 5'
It appears from the most recent Ninth Circuit decisions
that the appellate court has added another dimension to its
accounting of profits jurisprudence. In Reebok International,
Ltd. v. Marnatech Enterprises, Inc.,' the panel, citing to
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co.' stated,
"[alithough the relief provided by § 1117 is explicitly 'subject
to the principles of equity,' we have held that it is a per se
abuse of discretion to fail to award relief under § 1117 that is
adequate to make willful trademark infringement unprofit-
able."'58 By capturing the accounting remedy language in the
context of a standard of review, the Ninth Circuit described
when it would overturn a district court's decision not to
award an accounting. This, however, does not change the
Circuit's approach to determining when an award of an ac-
counting of an infringer's profits would be appropriate.
Unfortunately, the circuit panels in three subsequent
cases either inadvertently or unconsciously decided to morph
the factor approach into a bright line test requiring willful-
ness or bad faith, without first distinguishing between
trademark infringement actions brought pursuant to §
1114(1)(a) of the Lanham Act and those brought pursuant to §
1114(1)(b) of the same Act. The former applies to anyone who
uses in commerce a copy or imitation of the registered mark
of another in connection with the sale of goods or services
that is likely to cause confusion as to source,'59 and the latter
applies to publishers and printers not covered by § 1114(2)
and other advertisers who are induced to copy or imitate reg-
istered trademarks onto labels, signs, prints, packages, wrap-
155. See id. at 1274-75 (considering deterrence, harm to the consumer, and
harm to the owner's reputation in fashioning a remedy, "which will take all of
the economic incentive out of trademark infringement").
156. 970 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1992).
157. 692 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
158. See Reebok, 970 F.2d at 559; see also Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982
F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993). The Lindy Pen court stated:
[Wihere trademark infringement is deliberate and willful, this court
has found that a remedy no greater than an injunction 'slights' the pub-
lic. This standard applies, however, only in those cases where the in-
fringement is 'willfully calculated to exploit the advantage of an estab-
lished mark.' The intent of the infringer is relevant evidence on the
issue of awarding profits and damages and the amount.
Lindy Pen, 982 F.2d at 1405 (citations omitted).
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (Supp. V 1999).
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pers, receptacles, or advertisements. 6 ' Section 1114(1)(a)
violations will not require a trademark owner to show bad
faith on the part of the infringer before an accounting may be
awarded, but § 1114(1)(b) violations will require a trademark
owner to show that the induced infringer committed the copy-
ing with knowledge that such imitation was intended to cause
confusion before the owner is entitled to recover profits or
damages provided for in § 1117.
An example of this misreading of the Lanham Act protec-
tion provisions and the misapplication of § 1114 in the context
of § 1117 monetary recovery is Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc.' In
Adray, the Ninth Circuit, in a cursory one paragraph review
of the issue of willful infringement as a prerequisite to an
award of defendant's profit, stated:
An instruction that willful infringement is a prerequisite
to an award of defendant's profits may be error in some
circumstances (as when plaintiff seeks the defendant's
profits as a measure of his own damage), but was appro-
priate on the record in this case .... In these circum-
stances, [the plaintiff] could recover [the infringer's] prof-
its only if the infringement was willful.1
62
In an even more cursory analysis, the Ninth Circuit panel in
Gracie v. Gracie stated:
The Lanham Act provision upon which [defendant-counter
claimant's] trademark infringement rested, 15 U.S.C. §
160. See id. § 1114(1)(b); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 25.28
("[Pirofits or damages cannot be recovered from one who merely reproduces and
applies the mark to labels or advertising 'unless the acts have been committed
with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion
.... '.).
161. 76 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 1995).
162. Id. at 988 (citation omitted). Interestingly, the trademark owner filed a
petition for rehearing, which, although not granted, motivated the panel to re-
consider and amend the specific one paragraph section titled: "Willful Infringe-
ment as a Prerequisite to an Award of Defendant's Profits." Id. Despite the
amendment, the substance of the dicta did not change, but the court did append
language that described the suggestion for a rehearing en banc and no receipt of
a request by any judge for an en banc hearing. See id. This judicial inaction
may signal many things including, but not limited to, this being an inappropri-
ate case to clarify the law of awarding an accounting considering that the par-
ticular litigation spanned over thirty years, the application of the factor test as
opposed to the bright line test for the award of an accounting to facts of the case
would have led to the same outcome, or that the Ninth Circuit may be poised to
join those circuits that require proof of bad faith before permitting an award of
an accounting of an infringer's profits.
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1114, does not require actual consumer confusion for re-
covery of profits. Rather, by its terms § 1114 requires only
a likelihood of confusion combined with willful infringe-
ment: "The registrant shall not be entitled to recover prof-
its or damages unless the acts have been committed with
knowledge that such imitation is intended to cause confu-
sion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." While actual con-
fusion may be relevant as evidence of the likelihood of con-
fusion (which is required for an award of profits under §
1114), under our precedents a showing of actual confusion
is not necessary to obtain a recovery of profits. 61
In addition, another Ninth Circuit panel in Kassbaum v.
Steppenwolf Productions, Inc. stated in passing that "[a]ctual
consumer confusion is not required for profit recovery; it is
sufficient to show a likelihood of confusion combined with
willful infringement."
164
In citing to Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp.16' and other
Ninth Circuit decisions for the above quoted propositions, the
Ninth Circuit started in 1995 to offend its own precedents,
which require district courts to use their discretion to weigh
relevant factors when considering awarding an accounting in
response to proven violations of the Lanham Act. Instead, in
brief dicta, the Adray, Gracie, and Kassbaum panels, by mis-
reading the standards set for trademark infringement actions
under § 1114(1)(a), which do not make willful infringement a
prerequisite for recovery of an accounting, confused long-
standing Ninth Circuit jurisprudence to the potential detri-
ment of trademark owners, who already are saddled with
heavy burdens of proof in trademark infringement cases.'66
163. Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000).
164. Kassbaum v. Steppenwolf Productions, Inc., 236 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir.
2000). Because the panel did not find likelihood of confusion, it did not reach
the question of willful infringement and, thus, it did not broach the argument
that willfulness is not a prerequisite to recovery of an accounting of profits in
the Ninth Circuit.
165. 982 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1993).
166. The misapplication of the statutory language of § 1114(1)(b), which re-
stricts a registrant's recovery of profits and damages to acts by an induced in-
fringer who knowingly imitates a registered mark with the intent to use the
imitation to cause confusion in Adray, 76 F.3d 984, a case itself falling outside
of the section because the infringed mark was not registered, infected Gracie,
217 F.3d 1060, a case in which the Ninth Circuit failed to state whether the in-
fringement was premised upon § 1114(1)(a) or (b). This misreading later
wormed its way into Kassbaum, 236 F.3d 487, a case in which the circuit panel
expressly stated that the infringement was based solely on § 1114(1)(a).
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The Fifth Circuit routinely articulates its totality of the
circumstances test, which considers bad faith as one of sev-
eral non-exhaustive factors, to determine the correctness of
awarding the accounting of profits remedy in a trademark in-
fringement action."7 However, the Fifth Circuit jurispru-
dence also states in dicta that thorough research in the circuit
fails to uncover any situations when bad faith is not present,
but an award of the accounting remedy is still made.' In the
seminal case Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co.,169 the Fifth
Circuit broached the issue of whether diversion of sales is a
prerequisite to an award of an accounting.' This issue re-
flects the compensation theory, which proposed that one of
the underlying goals of a remedy for trademark infringement
is placing the injured party in the position he would have
been in absent the infringement.'' Compensation as the focal
point of a remedy provision necessarily requires an assess-
ment of harm to an injured party-lost or diverted sales in
the case of an injury resulting from trademark infringe-
ment.' Had the Maltina court followed the compensatory
theory to its natural end, there would be no chance of mone-
tary recovery for other types of harm absent a showing of di-
verted sales. Such a result would ignore the harm a trade-
mark owner suffers to reputation, goodwill, and the cost of
protecting the property interest inherent in a registered or
unregistered trademark. As such, Maltina also recognized
the unjust enrichment theory and the deterrence theory in
justifying an award of an accounting of profits."' To that end,
the Fifth Circuit espoused, "[the recognition of a trademark
as property is consistent with the view that an accounting is
proper even if the defendant and plaintiff are not in direct
167. See, e.g., Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l, Inc., 951 F.2d
684, 695-96 (5th Cir. 1992); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526,
554 (5th Cir. 1998); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Meece, 158 F.3d 816, 823 (5th
Cir. 1998); Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int'l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 369 (5th Cir. 2000).
168. See Seatrax, 200 F.3d at 372 n.9 (stating that "[alithough [this court
has] not expressly held that a finding of willfulness is required to trigger § 1117
damages,... our independent research reveals [no] cases from this circuit
where an accounting of profits has been awarded without a finding of willful-
ness").
169. 613 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1980).
170. Id. at 585.
171. See supra Part III.B.3.
172. Cf. Maltina, 613 F.2d at 585.
173. See id.
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competition, and the defendants' infringement has not di-
verted sales from the plaintiff."'74 The Fifth Circuit, in align-
ing itself with the other circuits that give the Lanham Act
remedy provision its congressional meaning-to make in-
fringement unprofitable, stated in Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v.
Hard Rock Cafe International, Inc.'75 that "diversion of sales
is not a prerequisite to an award of profits;" instead it, like
palming off, is "one of the factors to be considered."'76
Relying on the reasoning and policies from Maltina and
Texas Pig Stands, the Fifth Circuit announced that the
Lanham Act entitles a trademark holder to recovery of defen-
dant's profits, subject to the principles of equity, not based
upon the satisfaction of a bright line test; but rather, on a
weighing of relevant factors to arrive at a fair result for both
litigants. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit in Pebble Beach Co. v.
Tour 18 1 Ltd. stated:
While the court has not required a particular factor to be
present, relevant factors to the court's determination of
whether an award of profits is appropriate include, but are
not limited to, (1) whether the defendant had the intent to
confuse or deceive, (2) whether sales have been diverted,
(3) the adequacy of other remedies, (4) any unreasonable
delay by the plaintiff in asserting his rights, (5) the public
interest in making the misconduct unprofitable, and (6)
whether it is a case of palming off. Once an award is
found to be appropriate, a [tradelmark holder is only enti-
tled to those profits attributable to the unlawful use of its
mark.
17
Viewing the award of profits under a case-by-case paradigm
comports with the underlying principles that trademark pro-
tection and infringement concepts are fact intensive and re-
quire a focused eye to the dispute at hand. The existence of
such a course of conduct by an infringer, which tips the scales
toward awarding monetary relief for a trademark holder,
should not be expunged merely because one or several circuits
believe in the supremacy of what can be a non-contextual and
ill-defined element-bad faith-that may play a minor role in
174. Id.
175. 951 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1992).
176. Id. at 695.
177. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 554 (5th Cir. 1998) (ci-
tations omitted).
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categorizing the specific type of invasion engaged in by an in-
fringer.7 ' Moreover, the factor approach to determining the
appropriateness of an award of profits is consistent with the
great discretion that the Lanham Act remedy provision vests
in the trial judge,'79 who is charged with bringing principles of
equity to the resolution of an infringement. There is no mis-
taking that in any legitimate trademark infringement action,
the trademark holder is placed in the unenviable position of
incurring losses for the purpose of protecting a real and valu-
able property interest. Such losses should not be viewed as
unrecoverable on the injection of an apparition-like require-
ment of bad faith.
The Tenth Circuit's early precedent favored treating the
infringer as a trustee for profits accruing from illegal acts, de-
spite a lack of direct competition or actual confusion. 8 ° The
Tenth Circuit recognized that the award of equitable reme-
dies created a "welter of confusion" about both the legal and
equitable concepts of balanced, appropriate monetary relief in
trademark infringement cases.' Despite this apparent con-
fusion, the Tenth Circuit decided each trademark infringe-
ment case in accordance with the view that monetary recov-
ery, specifically an accounting of profits, remained a matter to
be considered at the discretion of the district court.'82 Thus,
the Circuit refused to disturb district court decisions when
178. According to the Fifth Circuit,
The goal behind the remedies of §§ 1116 and 1117 is to achieve equity
between or among the parties. In fashioning the appropriate remedy, a
legal determination of liability is not dispositive. Because each case
presents a different set of facts and circumstances, a case-by-case
evaluation is warranted to determine the nature of the infringing con-
duct and its adverse effects, if any, on the plaintiff.
Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int'l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 369 (5th Cir. 2000). Seatrax
was a Texas Corp. that manufactured offshore marine cranes known as
"SEAKING." Id. at 362. Defendants were former employees of plaintiff and,
upon leaving Seatrax, allegedly misappropriated production designs, formed a
new company, and competed with plaintiff by disseminating service manuals,
absent consent, for SEAKING parts that bore the SEAKING mark registered to
plaintiff, Seatrax. See id. at 362-63.
179. See supra Part IV; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (Supp. V 1999) ("The
court shall assess such profits and damages ... under its direction.").
180. See Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354, 363 (10th Cir.
1954).
181. Id. at 362-63.
182. See id.; see also Friedman v. Sealy, Inc., 274 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1959);
Bishop v. Equinox Int'l Corp., 154 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1998) (remanding
for a determination of whether an accounting of profits was appropriate).
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they demonstrated that trial judges first weighed various fac-
tors, such as intentional efforts to palm off goods as those of
the plaintiff, the amount, if any, of a damage award, and the
relative positions of the parties.'8 Even in its most recent ac-
counting of profits decision favoring a denial of the monetary
remedy, the Tenth Circuit stayed true to the balancing or fac-
tor approach when it quoted the district court with approval:
[T]his court believes the task before it is to consider all the
equities in the case anew and make a determination on
the applicability of an award of profits.
In considering all of the equities in this case, the relative
weakness of the mark, the lack of customer confusion or
deception, and that [the infringer] did not benefit from
[the trademark owner's] mark, the court rejects, as it did
in the original findings, the notion that prevention of un-
just enrichment is a sufficient rationale for awarding prof-
its. 1
84
While the Tenth Circuit appears to reject the unjust en-
richment theory to justify recovery of an accounting of profits,
this statement can be viewed as an inadvertent misstatement
of the law. Specifically, dissenting Circuit Judge Baldock
stated that "[u]njust enrichment is a well-established theory
of recovery for trademark infringement in [the Tenth Cir-
cuit]." '' Judge Baldock continued to explain that the district
court's statement regarding the rejection of unjust enrich-
ment was "presumably... intended.., to apply only to the
circumstances of the [presently litigated] case."'86 Judge Bal-
dock supported his conclusion by pointing to the district
court's weighing of the various factors surrounding the case to
decide that an award of profits was not necessary because,
among other things, the district court had, within its discre-
tion, awarded attorney's fees to the infringed trademark
owner. 87 In so holding, the district court strengthened the
argument that the Lanham Act remedy provision requires a
183. See Friedman, 274 F.2d at 255; see also Bardahl Oil Co. v. Atomic Oil
Co. of Okla., 351 F.2d 148, 150 (10th Cir. 1965).
184. See Estate of Bishop v. Equinox Int'l Corp., 256 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Estate of Bishop v. Equinox Int'l Corp., No. 96-C-006-E, slip
op. at 4 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 1999)).
185. Id. at 1059 (Baldock, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
186. Id.
187. See id. at 1060.
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factor approach as opposed to a bright line bad faith test for
recovery of profits; otherwise, the district court's finding of
exceptional circumstances supporting the award of attorney's
fees would also have required an award of an accounting, if
recovery of the latter is predicated on a bad faith require-
ment. As such, either the courts will require double proof
from a trademark owner, for example, to show bad faith and
then prove that a balancing of the equities favors her posi-
tion; or one level of proof consistent with the equitable princi-
ples of the Lanham Act remedy provision, which requires only
a weighing of the factors in a case-by-case analysis.
The Fourth and Federal Circuits have not weighed in
heavily on the correctness of awarding an accounting of an in-
fringer's profits in trademark infringement actions. For ex-
ample, in Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc.,188 the
Fourth Circuit summarily stated that "equitable damages, as
measured by the infringer's profits, can be awarded to the
trademark owner without proof of actual loss. However, the
district court has broad discretion to award any monetary re-
lief necessary to serve the interests of justice."189 Similarly,
the Federal Circuit, in Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores,
Inc., 9° implicitly approved a factor approach when it articu-
lated that "good faith is less probative than bad faith [when
deciding] the likelihood of confusion, yet [good faith/bad faith]
may be given considerable weight in fashioning a remedy."''
The pronouncements from the Fourth and Federal Circuits
suggest that the factor approach is the more effective means
to execute the Lanham Act remedy provision and adhere to
the spirit of its underlying policies, which are precluding un-
just enrichment, compensating the most innocent party, and
deterring infringement through warnings or discourage-
ment.
19 2
B. Bad Faith and the Case of Competing Goods Versus Non-
Competing Goods
The First Circuit is the lone trumpeter of the competing
188. 928 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1991).
189. Id. at 108 (citations omitted).
190. 750 F.2d 903 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
191. Id. at 915 (quoting AMF, Inc., v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 354
(9th Cir. 1979)).
192. See supra Part III.B.
904 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
goods paradigm for recovery of an accounting of defendant's
profits in trademark infringement actions. Few cases stand
out for the proposition that the accounting of a defendant's
profits will be awarded only to the extent that the trademark
owner and the infringer's goods are in direct competition, or
in the case of non-competing goods, that the accounting rem-
edy is available only upon a showing of bad faith. Under the
Lanham Act, the First Circuit has had only scant opportuni-
ties to refine a rule of law for when an accounting of defen-
dant's profits will be awarded. From its early decision in
1963' to its most recent holding in 1993, M the First Circuit
has established a circuitous test for when an accounting will
be allowed, despite the fact that, practically, the test recog-
nizes only the compensation and deterrence theories of recov-
195
ery.
Although the First Circuit is acquainted with the unjust
enrichment theory and its potential application to remedies
for trademark infringement, it continues to view trademark
violations as matters occupying the realm of torts, without
regard to the distinct property nature that trademarks have
attained.9 As recently as 1993, the First Circuit affirmed a
193. See Baker v. Simmons Co., 325 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1963).
194. See Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int'l, Inc., 999 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1993).
195. See id. at 6 (demonstrating that the First Circuit prefers to adhere to
the compensation theory of recovery in response to infringement when its rule
of law for an accounting requires a trademark owner to show direct competition
and the infringer's profits would have gone to the trademark owner if there was
no infringement).
196. Compare Baker, 325 F.2d 580 (holding that a trademark infringer is li-
able as a trustee for profits accruing from defendant's activity of using the name
"Simmonds" in connection with the business of upholstering and reupholstering
furniture, even though the owner of the trademark "Simmons" in connection
with the manufacture of furniture and sofa beds was not doing business in the
consuming market where the infringement occurred), with Valmor Prods. Co. v.
Standard Prods. Corp., 464 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1972) (concluding that defendant,
using the name "VALMOR" for electrical personal care items, was not engaged
in direct competition with plaintiff, Valmor, using its corporate name to do
business in the beauty aid market, and thus could not be considered a trustee
for profits that, but for the infringement, would have been Valmor's), and Qua-
baug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1977). In Qua-
baug, the court noted:
[Tihe district court based its award on an accounting of profits and did
not evaluate actual damages. Although this method is appropriate in
situations where the parties are selling competing goods in the same
market, in cases involving noncompeting goods, "the assumption can-
not be made that the defendant's profits constitute a fair measure of
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rule of law that continues to ignore the property nature of
trademarks as well as the Lanham Act's national protection
paradigm.197 In Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int'l, Inc.,
the First Circuit synthesized its rule of law for establishing a
"clear distinction between the showing required to establish a
right to injunction and that required to establish a right to
damages."198 In contrast to the plain meaning of the Lanham
Act, the First Circuit required an additional showing for the
award of monetary damages in four rules:
(1) [A] plaintiff seeking damages must prove actual harm,
such as the diversion of sales to the defendant; (2) a plain-
tiff seeking an accounting of defendant's profits must show
that the products directly compete, such that defendant's
profits would have gone to plaintiff if there was no viola-
tion; (3) the general rule of direct competition is loosened
if the defendant acted fraudulently or palmed off inferior
goods, such that actual harm is presumed; and (4) where
defendant's inequitable conduct warrants bypassing the
usual rule of actual harm, damages may be assessed on an
unjust enrichment or deterrence theory. 99
The four rules articulated by the First Circuit are firmly
entrenched in tort principles."' The first three rules require a
the plaintiffs loss, for defendant's sales are not diverted from the plain-
tiff."
Id. at 162 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) OF TORTS § 747
cmt. g (1982)).
197. See Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int'l, Inc., 999 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1993). Under the Lanham Act, recovery for infringement of registered and un-
registered trademarks does not depend upon a showing of direct competition.
Instead, remedies are invoked upon a showing of likelihood of confusion. Cf. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1117, 1125 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
198. Aktiebolaget Electrolux, 999 F.2d at 5 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Camel
Hair & Cashmere Inst. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 12 (1st Cir.
1986)). In Aktiebolaget Electrolux, plaintiff had used the trademark "Weed
Eater" since 1972 in its line of gardening products, while defendant had sold
"Leaf Eaters" since 1987. See id. at 2. The district court applied its version of
the Polaroid likelihood of confusion test to the brands to determine the exis-
tence of trademark infringement. See id. at 4; see also supra note 42 (delineat-
ing the Polaroid likelihood of confusion factors). The district court found in-
fringement, but it ordered only an injunction, because it found "that the goods
themselves are similar only in the broadest sense: they are gardening equip-
ment. The intended use and the cosmetics of the goods reveal significant differ-
ences in the two products .... ." Aktiebolaget Electrolux, 999 F.2d at 4. The dis-
trict court also found that while defendant did not act in bad faith, it knew
about the "Weed Eater" mark and the possibility of a legal contest. See id. at 3.
199. Aktiebolaget Electrolux, 999 F.2d at 5.
200. See supra notes 22, 120 and accompanying text.
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trademark owner to prove the tort element of factual causa-
tion before any monetary award, either damages or an ac-
counting, will be allowed."°' This factual causation require-
ment places a burden on the infringed trademark owner that
even the Lanham Act recognizes as intolerably too high.2 °2
The rules announced by the First Circuit make it more diffi-
cult for the injured party to receive a statutorily authorized
monetary award, while the infringer benefits from an addi-
tional layer of protection from liability. Interestingly, the
First Circuit, in affirming a district court decision to award
an accounting based upon the state law requirement of first
finding fraudulent intent on the part of a defendant, stated
that "the district court exercised its equitable powers appro-
priately by giving a windfall to the trademark owner rather
than the trademark infringer. " 2° In support of the balancing
windfalls language, the First Circuit cited Mishawaka Rubber
& Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co.,2"4 the Su-
preme Court precedent that certain circuits and commenta-
tors marginalize when professing the requirement for a show-
ing of bad faith before awarding an accounting of defendant's
profits.
Not only is the Lanham Act silent about the requirement
201. See Aktiebolaget, 999 F.2d at 5 (stating the "plaintiff must prove actual
harm, such as diversion of sales to the defendant," and "plaintiff seeking an ac-
counting of defendant's profits must show that the products directly compete,
such that defendant's profits have gone to plaintiff...").
202. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (Supp. V 1999) (stating that "[in assessing prof-
its the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's sales only").
203. Schroeder v. Lotito, 747 F.2d 801, 802 (1st Cir. 1984). The district court
found infringement of plaintiffs registered trademark by defendant who tried to
attract political printing business by using plaintiffs' union symbol. See id. The
district court, applying Rhode Island state law, issued an injunction and
awarded plaintiffs an accounting of profits totaling $635.91 as well as attorney's
fees and costs totaling $5,175. See id. Based upon the legislative history of the
Lanham Act, the First Circuit affirmed the award of attorney's fees by stating
"[tihe only requirement Congress placed upon the award of attorney's fees was
that the case be 'exceptional.' The legislative history shows that Congress in-
tended 'exceptional' to mean malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful in-
fringement." Id. (citation omitted). The First Circuit's reliance on legislative
history to give meaning to "exceptional" for purposes of awarding attorney's fees
begs the question why some circuits require a showing of bad faith before
awarding an accounting of defendant's profits, when the word "exceptional" is
not used in § 1117(a) as a condition on the first listed remedy of defendant's
profits.
204. See Schroeder, 747 F.2d at 802 (citing Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen
Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 207 (1942)).
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of showing bad faith before awarding an accounting, the Act
itself is meant to provide a national standard for the uniform
protection of registered and unregistered trademarks and
trade dress.05 Accordingly, the First Circuit's proliferation of
cases, which make arbitrary and unauthorized distinctions
between competing goods and noncompeting goods, is con-
trary to the national protection paradigm of the Lanham Act.
This distinction is unnecessarily duplicative of the Polaroid
"likelihood of confusion" test inherent in the Lanham Act's in-
fringement analysis. If goods are noncompeting, the Lanham
Act's "likelihood of confusion" analysis would consider this
fact when finding for a party under the "similarity of goods or
services" and the "similarity of trade channels" factors."6 Ac-
cordingly, from a legal standpoint, the First Circuit's rule is
antiquated and repetitious of the widely accepted "likelihood
of confusion" test for infringement. From a policy standpoint,
the First Circuit's adherence to proof of causation and a dis-
tinction between competing and noncompeting goods fails to
recognize that trademark infringement is not only viewed as
a tort concept, where diversion of monetary gain is the meas-
ure of harm, but also that trademark infringement in this
technological and information age is considered increasingly
an invasion of a property interest for which a wrongful actor
will receive a benefit or windfall if allowed to escape mone-
tary accountability.2 ' While the First Circuit theoretically
recognizes a remedy based on unjust enrichment in trade-
mark infringement cases, it does not give unjust enrichment
any practical affect, because it adheres to the competing
goods tort-like paradigm when deliberating on the type of
remedy that should be awarded.
C. Bad Faith as a Sine Qua Non in the Award of an
Accounting of Profits
Counter to the factor approach, the Second, Third, Sixth,
Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits have required a
showing of bad faith before the courts can consider ordering
an infringer to disgorge his profits. Spearheading the move-
ment toward a bright line rule for recovery of an accounting is
205. See Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1999)); see also Robert, supra note 1, at 375, 388-97.
206. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
207. See supra Part III.B.
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the Second Circuit. Based on Second Circuit jurisprudence, if
an owner of a trademark proves willful, deliberate infringe-
ment, or deception, an accounting of profits may be awarded,
which may be premised upon any one of three theories, in-
cluding unjust enrichment, compensation, or deterrence."'
According to the Second Circuit, a trademark owner needs to
consider other factors in addition to bad faith to justify an ac-
counting of an infringer's profits.2"9 These other factors in-
clude the following: the degree of certainty that the defendant
benefited from the unlawful conduct; the availability and
adequacy of other remedies; the role of a particular defendant
in effectuating the infringement; plaintiffs laches; and plain-
tiffs unclean hands.219 The Second Circuit liberally cites to
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition to support the
new, heightened standard,21' while authority for such a propo-
sition is conspicuously absent from prior Second Circuit
precedent following the passage of the Lanham Act.
208. See George Basch Co., Inc. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d
Cir. 1992). The Second Circuit explained its rule as follows:
The rule in this circuit has been that an accounting for profits is
normally available only if the defendant is unjustly enriched, if the
plaintiff sustained damages from the infringement, or if the accounting
is necessary to deter a willful infringer from doing so again. Courts
have interpreted the rule to describe three categorically distinct ration-
ales.
... [T]hat willfulness expressly defines the third rationale (deter-
rence) may suggest that the element of intentional misconduct is un-
necessary in order to require an accounting based upon a theory of un-
just enrichment or damages .... [A] closer investigation into the law's
historical development strongly supports our present conclusion that,
under any theory, a finding of defendant's willful deceptiveness is a
prerequisite for awarding profits.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
209. See id. at 1540.
210. See id. ("Having stated that a finding of willful deceptiveness is neces-
sary in order to warrant an accounting for profits, we note that it may not be
sufficient. While under certain circumstances, the egregiousness of the fraud
may, of its own, justify an accounting, generally, there are other factors to be
considered." (citations omitted)).
211. See id. at 1540-41 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 37 (1995)). In addition to expressing bad faith as a prerequisite
for an accounting, the Basch court stated:
The district court's discretion lies in assessing the relative importance
of these factors and determining whether, on the whole, the equities
weigh in favor of an accounting. As the Lanham Act dictates, every
award is "subject to equitable principles" and should be determined
"according to the circumstances of the case."
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For example, in Monsanto,212 the Second Circuit adopted
for the first time each of the three theoretical bases support-
ing recovery of an infringer's profits.213 What it did not do was
require a showing of bad faith in addition to proof of other
factors before approving the award of an accounting of an in-
fringer's profits. 214  The Monsanto court affirmed a finding
that the defendant "deliberately infringed the plaintiffs mark
by selling mattress pads falsely labeled as Acrilan-filled," a
product plaintiff produced and marketed as Acrilan. 5 De-
fendant claimed that Acrilan constituted 100% of the filling in
its mattress pads, when in reality, defendant used only be-
tween 9% and 25% of the product to fill its pads."6 Even
though the Monsanto court affirmed a finding of deliberate in-
fringement, " it did not state that the test for recovery of an
accounting of the infringer's profits required a bad faith show-
ing. Such might have been presumed, but the court's focus
was to articulate the nature of the right asserted by a trade-
mark owner in order to provide a legal foundation for estab-
lishing an award structure consistent with the identity and
value of a trademark. 18
The Monsanto court defined this right by distinguishing
between a trademark as "a means of protecting a business
man from injury resulting from another's use of his mark""2 9
and, in the alternative, a trademark as a form of property.22 °
Under the former view, a plaintiff would not be entitled to a
defendant's profits.2 2 1 To the extent that a legal fiction exists
to support an award of an accounting as an indirect measure
of the plaintiffs injury, the plaintiff would still have to dem-
onstrate some relationship between the infringer's profits and
his injuries. Such a narrow view implicitly requires the
212. Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.
1965).
213. See id. at 392-93.
214. See id. at 397 (finding an injunction inadequate to deter deliberate in-
fringement that defrauds consumers and injures a legitimate owner).
215. Id. at 390.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 391-93.
219. Id. at 392.
220. See id.
221. Id. (stating that injunctive relief may provide protection from injury
that has not yet happened, "but a monetary award.., is justified only to the
extent that injury is shown already to have been suffered").
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plaintiff to prove his and the infringer's goods are competing
for trade and, that as a consequence, some diversion of sales
by the defendant from the plaintiff resulted. The diversion of
sales concept has in all circuits, except the First, been re-
jected as applied to unjust enrichment and deterrence be-
cause the view ignores several points. These include, but are
not limited to, the following: the Lanham Act in its entirety
was meant to have a nationwide impact on notice and protec-
tion of distinctive trademarks, which provides for uniformity
in trademark protection as well as recovery;22 stating a re-
quirement to show competing goods before allowing a mone-
tary award of profits ignores the loss to the value of a distinc-
tive trademark that can occur in addition to losses in
revenues and profits; 223 and adhering to a competing goods
rule necessarily implies that there are also geographic compe-
tition restrictions, which would be counter to the nationwide
purpose and application of the Lanham Act. 4
In Monsanto, the court saw the proof of injury and diver-
sion of sales requirements as too onerous, because the plain-
tiff would have had to trace the sale of mattress pads priced
at $3.98 a piece from the defendant to its retailer to the ulti-
mate purchasers as well as provide the trial court with testi-
mony of a sampling of purchasers just to show some relation-
ship between defendant's infringement and plaintiffs
injury.22 5 Instead, the Second Circuit viewed the right of the
trademark owner as a pure property right, and thereby
adopted the unjust enrichment and the deterrence theories to
justify awarding an accounting of defendant's profits.226
The Monsanto court identified the two purposes of the
Lanham Act as protecting a trademark owner's investment in
a mark from misappropriation, and maintaining the public's
confidence in the marketplace by providing a mechanism to
ensure that the public will get the products it expects.227 The
first purpose is achieved only by viewing the trademark as a
form of property for which its owner receives exclusive use
222. Minnesota Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kempeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242,
1246 (8th Cir. 1994).
223. See Monsanto, 349 F.2d at 395; see also Minnesota Pet Breeders, 41 F.3d
at 1246-47.
224. See Monsanto, 349 F.2d. at 395.
225. See id. at 395-96.
226. See id. at 392-93.
227. See id. at 396.
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and enjoyment as against all others. Establishing the pa-
rameters of appropriate future business conduct for the pro-
tection of the public achieves the second purpose. The Second
Circuit affirmed that treating the mark as property is the
more appropriate rationale to effect the first purpose of the
Lanham Act's remedy provision; therefore, the theory of un-
just enrichment, as opposed to compensation theory and its
concept of injury and diversion of sales, is the benchmark
standard to apply when a court considers awarding an ac-
counting of an infringer's profits. 28 The court also deemed de-
terrence an appropriate theory to derail future infringing ac-
tivity, realizing that infringement becomes a principal line of
business not easily dissuaded absent an award of present day
229monetary recovery.
The Second Circuit's more recent position on the award of
the accounting of profits remedy presented itself in George
Basch Co., v. Blue Coral, Inc.2"' Although affirming a finding
of trade dress infringement, 3' the Second Circuit refused to
allow an award of an accounting of an infringer's profits for a
number of reasons. First, under the unjust enrichment ra-
tionale, the trademark owner failed to show diversion of
sales.232 Second, even if the trademark owner proved diver-
sion, the trademark owner failed to show bad faith. Third,
even if bad faith is shown, it may not be sufficient on its own,
due to "an essential distinction... between the deliberate at-
tempt to deceive and a deliberate attempt to compete," the
latter being distinguishable in the court's analysis by its im-
plicit approval of lawful imitation of certain successful fea-
tures of another's product.2 3 Accordingly, the Second Circuit
concluded that a lawful imitation of another's trade dress
would not have subjected the infringer to liability in the first
instance and, therefore, a monetary remedy would not be
forthcoming because there would be no infringement to rem-
228. See id. at 395-96.
229. See id. at 392-97.
230. 968 F.2d 1532.
231. Id. at 1537.
232. Id. at 1541.
233. See id. (citing Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d
569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959) for the proposition that "[a]bsent confusion, imitation of
certain successful features in another's product is not unlawful and to that ex-
tent a 'free ride' is permitted").
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edy.23" If an alleged infringer is actually engaging in deliber-
ate competition, his conduct will not subject him to liability
until that conduct moves from competitive to infringing. By
requiring the trademark owner to show diversion, bad faith,
and unfair competition, the Second Circuit increased the bur-
den for trademark owners to demonstrate their entitlement to
monetary relief absent any statutory indication that Congress
contemplated such a three-tiered burden.
The Sixth Circuit appeared to be in lock step with the
Second Circuit with its articulation of a bad faith require-
ment as a prerequisite for recovery of an infringer's profits, at
least until its decision in Wynn Oil Co. v. American Way Ser-
vice Corp.235 Prior to Wynn Oil, the Sixth Circuit mechani-
cally cited and followed the Second Circuit's conclusion "that
for an accounting, plaintiff must show 'not only that the in-
fringer infringed, but that he did so with the deliberate intent
to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive purchasers; in other
words, to purposely palm off the infringer's goods as those of
the infringed."'236 The Sixth Circuit has not taken steps to
weigh the import of the three underlying theories supporting
the Lanham Act remedy provision. Instead, the Sixth Circuit
relies upon the bright line rule that a showing of bad faith
will justify an accounting, and if bad faith is rebutted an in-
junction would restrain any further violation of the property
interest in a trademark owner's mark.237
More recently, the Sixth Circuit has begun to distance it-
self from the bright line rule for recovery of an accounting of
234. See id.
235. 943 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1991).
236. Nalpac Ltd. v. Corning Glass Works, 784 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the owner of the registered mark "Common Scents" for a line of
incense sticks could not receive monetary relief, specifically an accounting, from
an infringer who conducted an inadequate search of the registry before using
the "Common Scents" mark on its line of candles housed in a glass mason jar,
because the infringer raised a good faith defense and the trial judge concluded
"that equity ... weigh[ed] in favor of granting the permanent injunction [and
not the award of] monetary relief").
237. See Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, 849 F.2d 1012, 1015
(6th Cir. 1988) ("If a plaintiff has the absolute right to the use of a particular
word or words as a trade mark, then, if an infringement is shown, the wrongful
or fraudulent intent is presumed, and although allowed to be rebutted in ex-
emption of damages, the further violation of the right of property will neverthe-
less be restrained."). See also WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084
(6th Cir. 1983) (requiring plaintiff to prove wrongful intent as required by 15
U.S.C. § 1114(1)(b) in awarding defendant's profits).
912 [Vol. 42
20021 REMEDYING TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 913
profits, but whether this distancing portends a change from
the adoption of the Second Circuit rule remains to be seen. In
Wynn Oil, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding
of trademark infringement, where the plaintiff used its regis-
tered mark "X-TEND" for a line of products designed for use
by professional automobile service technicians, and defendant
used the registered mark "X-TEND" in marketing its ex-
tended warranty insurance program to new and used car
dealers."' Although the plaintiff prevailed on the liability,
the trial court "declined to award damages because it could
not 'on the facts of the record ascertain the profits made as a
result of Defendants' willful infringement."'239 The Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed the trial court and concluded that "the district
court abused its discretion by refusing to award plaintiffs a
recovery based on defendants' profits.""2 ' The Sixth Circuit
did not take a hard line view about the meaning and import
of bad faith. Instead, the court borrowed the analysis of the
intent factor from the likelihood of confusion test to justify its
determination that the defendant in Wynn Oil engaged in in-
tentional infringement, which is defined by either use of a
mark with knowledge of another's prior use or presumed
knowledge through a showing of long use and wide adver-
tisement of a trademark."' The Sixth Circuit's retreat to in-
tentional infringement, a standard requiring a showing of
conduct not amounting to willfulness, as the basis for recov-
ery of an accounting of profits is a recognition of both the
property interest in trademarks and an appreciation that the
Lanham Act remedy provision calls upon courts to view all of
the circumstances of a case before deciding, based upon equi-
table principles, whether an accounting of an infringer's prof-
its is warranted. This conclusion is reinforced by the Sixth
Circuit's use of language from the Seventh Circuit, the leader
in asserting the nonexistence of a bad faith requirement for
award of an accounting, which stated:
The Lanham Act specifically provides for the awarding of
profits in the discretion of the judge subject only to princi-
ples of equity .... The trial court's primary function is to
238. See Wynn Oil, 943 F.2d at 598-99, 604.
239. Id. at 605 (quoting Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 736 F. Supp.
746, 758 (E.D. Mich. 1990)).
240. Id. at 607.
241. See id. at 602-03.
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make violations of the Lanham Act unprofitable to the in-
fringing party. Other than general equitable considera-
tions, there is no express requirement that the parties be
in direct competition or that the infringer willfully in-
fringe the trade dress to justify an award of profits. Prof-
its are awarded under different rationales including un-just enrichment, deterrence, and compensation.242
The Sixth Circuit has even realized the validity of an account-
ing absent bad faith when it applied Michigan law in a diver-
sity of citizenship case, where a prior user of a trademark re-
lied upon state law regarding unfair competition to protect its
common law right to use the trademark within the state
against a federal registrant of substantially the same mark.2 4
"Under Michigan law, a demonstration of bad faith is not re-
quired; [r]ather, once the infringing party is put on notice of
its possibly infringing behavior, it then subjects itself to po-
tential liability for profits it realizes from the infringing con-
duct., 244 While the Sixth Circuit has yet to question directly
its prior jurisprudence, the Circuit does seem to be relaxing
its previous adherence to the Second Circuit bright line rule
of bad faith as a prerequisite for the award of an accounting
of profits.
The District of Columbia Circuit also adopted the bright
line rule. This circuit admonished the district court for fail-
ing to make findings of fact in Foxtrap Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc.245
before approving a monetary award. The District of Colum-
bia Circuit, on remand, instructed the district court to state
the basis for a monetary award and, in so doing, recognized
that "courts customarily require a plaintiff to show bad faith
or willful infringement by the defendant" in trademark in-
fringement cases; but, absent a showing of bad faith, "some
courts [base] an award of defendant's profits on an unjust en-
richment theory," which then requires "a showing that plain-
tiffs sales actually had been diverted, thus necessitating a
showing of actual competition." 46  The District of Columbia
Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit, chose to follow the Second Cir-
242. Id. at 606-07 (quoting Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th
Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
243. See Standard Coffee Co. v. Wm. B. Reily & Co., No. 98-1468, 2000 WL
377358 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2000).
244. Id. at *5.
245. 671 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
246. Id. at 641-42.
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cuit without distinguishing the three theories of recovery
supporting the monetary remedy of an accounting.
To further confuse this area of the law, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit implicitly suggests that the unjust enrichment
theory requires some showing of actual competition and di-
version of sales.247 In addition, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit suggests that the unjust enrichment theory would pro-
vide the possibility for a court to award damages in the event
of infringement."' This assertion again strips the unjust en-
richment theory of its property characteristics and masquer-
ades the theory as a tort principle available only to make an
injured party whole. While the District of Columbia Circuit
sealed its allegiance to the bad faith requirement, it para-
doxically admitted that the Lanham Act's remedy provision
"entitle[s] [a] party to monetary relief," subject to equitable
principles, upon that party establishing a trademark in-
fringement violation.49 The statement is significant in two
respects. First, the District of Columbia Circuit attempted to
247. See id. at 642 n.9. "Where no bad faith was shown, some courts have
based an award of defendant's profits on an unjust enrichment theory. In such
cases, the courts have required a showing that plaintiffs sales actually had
been diverted, thus necessitating a showing of actual competition." Id.
248. See Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d
800, 807-08 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court in Reader's Digest stated:
This court has held that a district court generally may award profits
under the Lanham Act only when a defendant's infringement was "will-
ful" or in "bad faith." We also left open the possibility that a court
could properly award damages to a plaintiff when the defendant has
been unjustly enriched.
Id. (citation omitted).
249. Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 970 (D.C. Cir.
1990). Alpo Petfoods held, in a case where both parties sued each other for false
advertising under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), that both litigants violated the Lanham
Act and, therefore, a monetary award may become due to both parties regard-
less of the greater wrongdoing by one party over the other, an approach the dis-
trict court relied upon in determining one party deserving of a monetary award
over the other party. See id. The District of Columbia Circuit stated that:
The Lanham Act does not authorize courts to deny monetary relief for
these reasons. Once a party establishes a violation of section 43(a),
section 35(a) "entitle[s]" that party to monetary relief, subject only to
the statutes referred to in the section and to the principles of equity.
Since section 35(a) expressly provides for compensation, rather than
punishment, courts dealing with offsetting meritorious claims must let
the degree of injury that each party proves, rather than the degree of
opprobrium that the court attaches to each party's conduct, determine
the monetary relief.
Id. (citations omitted).
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give the Lanham Act remedy provision its plain meaning,
which arguably would require the Second Circuit and its fol-
lowers to admit that the remedy provision does not state a re-
quirement for a showing of bad faith before a trademark
owner who has proved trademark infringement may receive
an accounting of an infringer's profits. Second, the District of
Columbia Circuit implicitly realizes that once a trademark
owner proves infringement, an invasion has occurred pursu-
ant to property principles and an entitlement in the trade-
mark owner to recover the accounting of profits remedy is
perfected because of a defendant's infringing conduct, not by a
showing of a compensable injury.
Trailing the circuits requiring a bad faith showing is the
Eighth Circuit, which has only recently been able to discard
regional, pre-Lanham Act market penetration principles to
arrive at viewing remedies in light of the post-Lanham Act
national trademark protection paradigm.20 By parroting Sec-
ond Circuit decisions, the Eighth Circuit settled on the re-
quirement to provide proof of bad faith before recovering an
accounting of profits in Minnesota Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell
& Kampeter, Inc.21  Like several other circuits, the Eighth
Circuit did not attempt to analyze whether a showing of bad
faith is necessary before a court can consider disgorging an
infringer's profits. The Eighth Circuit summarily concluded
that "[iif a registered owner proves willful, deliberate in-
fringement or deception, 'an accounting of profits may be
based upon: 1) unjust enrichment, 2) damages, or 3) deter-
rence of a willful infringer."'252 The Minnesota Pet Breeders
court states that because the remedy provision is "grounded
in equity and bars punitive remedies, 'an accounting will be
denied in a trademark infringement action if an injunction
250. The legislatively overruled Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine applied in Pre-
Lanham Act common law trademark actions involving an infringing use of a
trademark in a geographic area where the trademark owner's products were not
sold. The owner of the senior common law mark could not prohibit a good faithjunior user from infringing on the same or similar mark when the junior user
used the mark in a local market remote from the senior user's trade area. See
Minnesota Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kempeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 1245(8th Cir. 1994); see generally United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248
U.S. 90 (1918) (discussing and applying the common law of trademarks, specifi-
cally the good faith of a junior user and the remote geographical area of trade
principles).
251. 41 F.3d 1242, 1247 (8th Cir. 1994).
252. See id.
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will satisfy the equities. ' ' 2iu This position is flawed to the ex-
tent that it presumes the accounting remedy is penal in na-
ture as opposed to being a method to ensure that accrued
benefits inuring from the use of a trademark owner's property
is placed back with the owner and not lost to the infringer.
Finally, the Third Circuit recently weighed in on the
question of whether a showing of bad faith is required before
an accounting of profits can be awarded.24 The Third Circuit
has answered this question in the affirmative with one of the
most current cases in accounting of profits federal jurispru-
dence, Secureacomm Consulting Inc. v. Secureacom Inc.255
The plaintiff in Securacomm began a small security systems
consulting company in Pennsylvania, developed and used the
trade name in 1981, and federally registered the name in
1997.256 The defendant began using a similar name in 1987
and failed at federal registration in 1992.257 The plaintiff be-
came aware of the defendant's use of the name and sent a
cease and desist letter in 1993, four years before the plaintiff
received its registration.2 58  The parties attempted to settle
the matter, but the defendant stalled on several occasions,
253. Id. (citations omitted).
254. Previous Third Circuit jurisprudence dealt with the issue of whether ac-
tual damages must be shown before an accounting of profits remedy can be
awarded. These decisions rely on a showing of past harm from trademark in-
fringement measurable in dollars and cents. These cases do not provide prece-
dent for requiring a showing of bad faith before an award of the accounting
remedy will be permitted. See, e.g., Nat'l Dryer Mfg. Corp. v. Nat'l Drying
Mach. Co., 228 F.2d 349, 350 (3d Cir. 1955) ("With respect to plaintiffs claim for
profits, the trial court [was] correct in its finding that there is no proof of any
damages suffered. . . ."); Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Davis Mfg. Co., 251 F.2d
924, 927 (3d Cir. 1958) ("[An accounting for profits] will be denied... where
there is a clear showing that no profit was made."); Caesars World, Inc. v. Ve-
nus Lounge, Inc., 520 F.2d 269, 274 (3d Cir. 1975) ("If the record in the district
court contains no evidence of actual damage or actual profit in dollars and cents
no monetary award may be made under § 35 of the Lanham Act and the trade-
mark owner must be content with injunctive relief."); Donsco, Inc. v. Casper
Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 607 (3d Cir. 1978) (explaining that it is a "misapprehension
that reasonable damages could be assessed without regard to actual damages,"
and that damages must be "based on either actual damages to the plaintiff or
actual profits of the infringer, measurable in dollars and cents"); A & H Sports-
wear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1999)
(quoting Williamson-Dickie, 251 F.2d at 927).
255. 166 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2001).
256. See id. at 184.
257. See id. at 184-85.
258. See id. at 185.
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thus, causing the plaintiff to file suit."9 The district court
found that infringement had occurred, that actual confusion
also occurred, and that the confusion prejudiced the plaintiff;
regardless, the district court declined to enter an amount of
compensatory damages, because, although plaintiff likely suf-
fered damages, the damages could not be measured with rea-
sonable precision.26 ° Instead, the district court found that an
award of defendant's profits was necessary to deter the de-
fendant's infringing conduct.26' On appeal, Judge Alito con-
cluded that the record did not support a finding of willful in-
fringement and, therefore, found the district court's award of
profits not warranted and the trebling of damages inappro-
priate."2 Specifically, the Circuit court held, surprisingly,
that willful infringement did not exist in Securacomm, be-
cause the defendant was not aware of the plaintiffs company
before the cease and desist letter, the defendant was not re-
quired to conduct a trademark search, and the defendant was
not required to stop using the trademark, even after receiving
notice, because the defendant reasonably believed he had a
legal right to use the mark.263 The Circuit court premised its
authority to reverse the district court's monetary awards for
trademark infringement on the question of willfulness.264
As such, the Third Circuit defines the equitable princi-
ples of the Lanham Act remedy provision as requiring a show-
ing of willfulness. In Securacomm, the Third Circuit stated:
Whether [a defendant] engaged in willful infringement is
significant because courts, looking to the principles of eq-
uity, have held that a finding of willfulness or bad faith is
important in determining whether to award profits, en-
hance damages, and award attorneys' fees .... Since the
evidence does not support a finding that [defendant] will-
fully infringed [the plaintiffs] trademark rights, we con-
clude that the award of profits was not appropriate in the
2651present case.
The Third Circuit's holding falls in line with the circuits
above, particularly the Second Circuit, which has read into
259. See id.
260. See id. at 186.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 190.
263. See id. at 187-89.
264. See id. at 188.
265. Id. at 187-90.
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the Lanham Act remedy provision a bad faith requirement as
the single measure of the balancing of the equities. When a
trademark owner is unable to prove bad faith or willfulness,
this unfortunate reading has the effect of giving a trademark
infringer a pass on his infringement, in spite of any unde-
served benefit he received from the infringing activity. Had
Congress intended this result, it would have substituted the
language "subject to equitable principles" with the language
"subject to a showing of bad faith or willfulness."
VI. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL CONFUSION ABOUT
THE FUNCTION OF BAD FAITH IN THE AWARD OF AN
ACCOUNTING OF PROFITS
A. The Function of Bad Faith in the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act
An addition to the Lanham Act, the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA") authorizes a federal cause of
action for dilution.266 The act defines dilution as the lessening
of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services, regardless of competition or likelihood of
confusion.267 Generally, the remedy for dilution is an injunc-
tion, unless the owner of the famous mark is able to show
266. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109
Stat. 985 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127). Commen-
tary on H.R. 1295, later signed into law as the FTDA, expressed the rationale
for the legislation:
The purpose of H.R. 1295 is to protect famous trademarks from sub-
sequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or
disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion. H.R. 1295
does this by amending Section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 to add
a new subsection (c) to provide protection against another's commercial
use of a famous mark, which results in dilution of such mark. Pres-
ently, the nature and extent of the remedies against trademark dilu-
tion vary from state to state and, therefore, can provide unpredictable
and inadequate results for the trademark owner ....
H.R. 1295 would add a new section 43(c) to the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. et. seq., to create a federal cause of action to protect famous
marks from unauthorized users that attempt to trade upon the good-
will and established renown of such marks and, thereby, dilute their
distinctive quality. The provision is intended to protect famous marks
where the subsequent, unauthorized commercial use of such marks by
others dilutes the distinctiveness of the mark.
H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2-3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1029-30 (section heading within report omitted).
267. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 1999).
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that the offending party acted willfully.2"' If willfulness is
shown, monetary remedies, including an award of damages,
treble damages, attorney's fees, and an accounting of profits
may be available to the owner of the famous mark.26 9
One need only look to the language of the FTDA,"7' which
protects both registered and unregistered famous trademarks
from dilution, to comprehend the role of bad faith in a deter-
mination of monetary recovery for dilution as opposed to in-
fringement. The FTDA was designed to protect owners of fa-
mous marks from those who would lessen the degree of
distinctiveness of such marks by using them on either similar
or dissimilar products, goods, or services.27' The federal cause
of action for dilution, unlike the cause of action for infringe-
ment, does not require proof of competition or a showing of
likelihood of confusion. The goal of the provision is to protect
a famous mark from injuries unrelated to consumer confusion
or competition. 72 A diluter often seeks to disparage an oth-
erwise respected mark or intends to create a dual, non-
confusing psychological association in the minds of the con-
suming public, such that the public recognizes both producers
268. See id. § 1125(c)(2).
In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous
mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief as set forth in section
1116, unless the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully
intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the
famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous
mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 1117(a)
and 1118... subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of
equity.
Id.
269. See id. § 1117.
270. See id. § 1125(c).
271. See Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
Dilution is an injury that differs materially from that arising out of the
orthodox confusion. Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a
mark may be debilitated by another's use. This is the essence of dilu-
tion. Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infec-
tion, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising
value of the mark.
Id.
272. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1030 ("Dilution does not rely upon the standard test of infringement, that
is, likelihood of confusion, deception or mistake. Rather, it applies when the
unauthorized use of a famous mark reduces the public's perception that the
mark signifies something unique, singular, or particular.").
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as independent sources of the famous mark.73 Because a di-
luter may not necessarily desire to inflict direct monetary in-
jury to the trademark owner, a damage remedy allowing for
monetary relief would not completely respond to the type of
injury suffered by the owner of a famous trademark. There-
fore, Congressional wisdom dictated that an injunction would
be the first line of defense against dilution of famous marks,274
to ensure that the nationwide identity of a mark will repre-
sent only one source, not many, for once diluted, a famous
mark loses the essence of its value-the ability to identify one
source-and this essence can neither be regained once lost
nor replenished by a monetary remedy.275
Dilution is an extraordinary cause of action that requires
the trademark owner to prove a mark's fame before the owner
can assert that a subsequent user diluted the distinctive qual-
ity of the mark.276 Because of the unique protection afforded
famous trademarks, any corresponding remedy is required to
be premised on equally unique and exceptional circum-
stances.277 Congress expressly recognized that unique circum-
stances required extraordinary relief when it defined the type
of monetary relief available for trademark owners pursuing
certain types of actions or seeking certain types of relief.78
For example, to recover any monetary relief for dilution, the
273. See Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2000, 37 HOUS.
L. REV. 729, 768 (2000) ("The sine qua non of dilution is association. To impact
a commercial definition, a junior mark must 'conjure an association with the
senior.'" (footnote omitted)).
274. Upon passage of the FTDA, made with the Senate's approval of S. 1513,
the companion bill to H.R. 1295, a section-by-section analysis of the FTDA was
printed in the Congressional Record that stated, in part:
With respect to relief, a new Section 43(c)(2) of the Lanham Act would
provide that, normally, the owner of a famous mark will only be enti-
tled to injunctive relief upon a finding of liability. An award of dam-
ages, including the possibility of treble damages, may be awarded
upon a finding that the defendant willfully intended to trade on the
trademark owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark.
141 CONG. REC. S19311 (1995).
275. See Swann, supra note 273, at 768 ("[C]ommunicative clarity [of a fa-
mous mark], once lost, cannot be readily reestablished.").
276. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. V 1999) ("The owner of a famous mark
shall be entitled.., to an injunction against another person's commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has be-
come famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.").
277. See id. § 1125(c)(2).
278. See id.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
trademark owner must show willfulness. 9 Similarly, in in-
fringement actions as well as dilutions actions, a trademark
owner must show exceptional circumstances before receiving
an award of attorney's fees.8 ° Unlike these two forms of
monetary relief, the remedy of an accounting of a defendant's
profits in response to a proven claim of trademark infringe-
ment is not restricted by proof of extraordinary or exceptional
circumstances.28 '
B. The Function of Bad Faith in the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act
In 1999, Congress further added to the Lanham Act and
enacted the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
("ACPA"), which provides a cause of action against anyone
who, with bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of an-
other's trademark or service mark, registers, traffics in, or
uses a domain name that is identical to, confusingly similar
to, or in the case of famous marks, dilutive of such trade-
mark.282 In determining bad faith, a court may consider fac-
tors such as, but not limited to the following:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of
the person, if any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the
legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise
commonly used to identify that person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any of the domain name in
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or ser-
vices;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of
the mark in a site accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner's online location to a site accessible under the do-
main name that could harm the goodwill represented by
the mark... ;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign
the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for
279. See id.
280. See id. § 1117(a).
281. See supra Parts IV, V.A; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
282. See Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-545 (1999).
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financial gain without having used, or having an intent to
use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any
goods or services... ;
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading
contact information when applying for the registration of
the domain name... ;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple
domain names which the person knows are identical or
confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive
at the time of registration... ; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the per-
son's domain name registration is or is not distinctive and
famous [with respect to a claim of dilution] .
This anti-cyberpiracy provision addresses only one of the
many dilemmas that cyberspace raises-the illicit use of do-
main names on the Internet.284
Despite its limited scope, the ACPA provides an excellent
example of Congress's intent to premise recovery for acts of
cyberpiracy upon a showing of bad faith intent to profit from
the use of another's mark. An action under the ACPA is also
an extraordinary protection, because it recognizes and pro-
tects the property rights of a trademark owner in cyberspace
against Internet service providers and the like as well as ac-
tual squatters registering with these service providers.285
283. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)-(IX).
284. See Shields v. Zuccarini, No. 00-2236, 2001 WL 671607 (3d Cir. June 15,
2001).
285. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i)-(ii). This type of protection has constitu-
tional First Amendment implications because trademark owners, particularly
those whose marks are in the form of words, may be able to exercise in rem ju-
risdiction to obtain courts orders to forfeit, cancel, or transfer another's regis-
tered domain name to the trademark owner upon a showing of bad faith. The
constitutional dilemma is evident. A domain name is merely a group of words
that provide instructions to a network of computers to pull up a copy of a coded
page on the World Wide Web. A domain name in its simplest sense is language
used to communicate a location in cyberspace. If such language is permitted to
be monopolized pursuant to trademark protection, then the public's use of this
language becomes restricted. A basic definition of a domain name is that it is
part of the official name of a web site and/or e-mail on the Internet. It
consists of a unique name, called second-level domain; and the top-level
extension (TLD). These two components are separated by a dot, also
called a root. For example, yourname.com. A domain name replaces a
series of numbers called Internet protocol (IP) numbers that are used
by computers to locate e-mail and web sites.
YvETTE LE BLANC, DICTIONARY OF INTERNET TERMS: Category: Internet do-
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While recovery is typically limited to equitable actions, do-
main name registrars may be liable for injunctive or mone-
tary relief if they show reckless disregard, bad faith, or a will-
ful failure to comply with such court orders."6 In this context,
such monetary relief is also considered extraordinary because
the anti-cyberpiracy provision's primary goal is to place the
domain name in the hands of the trademark owner, not nec-
essarily to provide monetary relief.287 Thus, the ACPA like
the FTDA, is an extraordinary action that permits a mone-
tary remedy in only exceptional circumstances, while again,
the language of the remedy of an accounting for profits in re-
sponse to trademark infringement is not so restrictive.288
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress did not intend bad faith to be a requirement for
an award of the remedy of an accounting of profits in re-
sponse to cases of trademark infringement. As demonstrated
by a review of the newest substantive additions to the
Lanham Act-the FTCA and the ACPA-it is apparent that
Congress had several opportunities to consider and include a
bad faith requirement before permitting an award of an ac-
counting of an infringer's profits. With each opportunity,
Congress remained silent on this issue. Taking the language
surrounding the Lanham Act's remedy provision... and re-
viewing the legislative history of the Trademark Act, 9° the
FTCA,29' and the ACPA,92 it is evident that the accounting of
profits remedy is restricted to bad faith showings only when
the cause of action pressed by the trademark owner is dilu-
tion or cybersquatting. Nowhere in the language of the stat-
ute or the legislative history is there a requirement to show
main names, at http://www.domain-names-2.net/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
286. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) ("The remedies in an in rem action un-
der this paragraph shall be limited to a court order for the forfeiture or cancella-
tion of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the
mark."); see also id. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(ii) ("The domain name registrar or registry
or other domain name authority shall not be liable for injunctive or monetary
relief under this paragraph except in the case of bad faith or reckless disregard,
which includes a willful failure to comply with any such court order.").
287. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i)-(ii).
288. See id. 88 1051, 1114, 1117, 1125.
289. See id. § 1117(a).
290. See S. REP. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274.
291. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
292. See id. § 1125(d).
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bad faith in trademark infringement actions before the ac-
counting remedy can be awarded. The only limitation on the
award of accounting of a defendant's profits in infringement
actions is the discretion of the trial judge.2" Thus, it is the
role and obligation of the trial judge to balance the equities,
without using bad faith as the benchmark standard, in decid-
ing whether a particular trademark infringement case neces-
sitates an award of an accounting of profits to a trademark
owner whose property has been invaded by an infringer.
293. See id. § 1117(a).
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APPENDIX
Table 1
Number of Cases by Circuit Chart
Directly
Factor Competing Prerequi-
Goods site
1st Cir. 6
2d Cir. 8
3d Cir. 2
4th Cir. 1
5th Cir. 5
6th Cir. 2 4
7th Cir. 4 1
8th Cir. 3 1
9th Cir. 7 3
10th Cir. 1 3
11th Cir. 6
D.C. Cir. 2
Fed. Cir. 1
Table 1: Number of Cases Deciding the Role of Bad
Faith in the Award of an Accounting of a Defendant's Profits
in Response to a Trademark Infringement Action
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APPENDIX, CONT'D
Table 2
Test by Circuit Chart
Directly
Factor Competing Prerequi-
Goods site
1st Cir. X
2d Cir. X
3d Cir. X
4th Cir. X
5th Cir. X
6th Cir. X
7th Cir. X
8th Cir. X
9th Cir. X
10th Cir. X
11th Cir. X
D.C. Cir. X
Fed. Cir. X
Table 2: Circuit-by-Circuit Analysis of the Use of Bad Faith
in the Award of an Accounting of a Defendant's Profits in Re-
sponse to a Trademark Infringement Action
